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Return Right For Former Owners Of
Land Taken By Eminent Domain
NATHANIEL STERLING*
Under present law, when a condemnor acquires property for a
public use by condemnation, it acquires all the rights and incidents
of ownership. If the condemnor thereafter fails to devote the
property to the public use for which it was acquired or any other
public use, it may transfer the property back to private owner-
ship with no requirement that it provide preferential treatment to
the former owner. This study reviews the law governing the con-
demnor's right to transfer property which was acquired for a pub-
lic use to subsequent private ownership, and examines the issues
and practical problems involved in developing a form of re-
turn right for the former owner.
Private property may not constitutionally be taken by eminent do-
main except for a "public use."' Occasionally, however, a public
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ifornia, Davis. Member of the legal staff of the California Law Revision Commission.
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1. "[NJor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner .. ." CAL. CoNsT.
art. 1, §14. In addition, the California Code of Civil Procedure defines eminent
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entity takes property for intended public use, but thereafter fails to
devote it to that use or to any public use.2 The frequency of this oc-
currence is impossible to estimate. It is known, however, that the
number of condemnors is enormous, 3 public landholdings are vast,4
and the number of eminent domain acquisitions has tended to be quan-
titatively large over the years.5 Moreover, although the figures for
domain as "the right of the people or Government to take private property for public
use." CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §1237. One authority on the law of eminent domain
states:
Where the property is taken for a public use by eminent domain, the
proper exercise of the power is predicated upon the premise that such prop-
erty will be devoted to the public use for which it is taken within a reasonable
time after the taking.
2A P. NICHOLS, Emn, NT DolAIN §7.1[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
NICHOLS].
2. E.g., Arechiga v. Housing Authority, 159 Cal. App. 2d 657, 324 P.2d 973(1958); cf. Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid, 234 Cal. App. 2d 100,
44 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1965), in which a school board acquired land for a schoolhouse by
grant deed after having first instituted eminent domain proceedings; several years later,
after the land had greatly increased in value, the board sought to sell it, having tem-
porarily used the land for school purposes but without ever having built the schoolhouse
upon it.
3. The exact number is uncertain. An analysis of the statutes of California
reveals that there are at least 500 cities and counties and well over 2,000 special dis-
tricts (not including county drainage and flood control districts, county and regional
sewage disposal districts, and parking districts) authorized to take. There are also an
unknown number of local agencies, school districts, public utilities, railroad corpora-
tions, cemetery authorities, housing authorities, and municipal utility districts authorized
to take. In addition, of course, the state and federal governments can and do take
enormous amounts of land.
4. Of the total gross area of the State of California, measuring 101,563,520
acres, over half (51,573,179) is publicly owned. See 1969 CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT 1 (1969); CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMMISSION, PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP
IN CALIFORNIA at iii (1969).
5. The exact amount of land acquired by condemnors each year through con-
demnation is unknown. In the past, the number of condemnation cases brought in
superior court has rapidly increased although there is some indication that the rate is
beginning to slow (see note 9 infra). In 1967-68, for instance, 11,518 eminent domain
actions were filed, a 23% increase over the preceding year. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADmNIsTRAnVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS 131-32 (1969). It is known that the number of eminent domain proceedings
filed does not reflect the number of parcels taken by public entities from private
persons since often the mere threat of condemnation encourages an owner to negoti-
ate a settlement. For example, of the 6,590 parcels taken by the California Division of
Highways in 1967-68, only 194 were contested court awards, the remainder being nego-
tiated settlements under threat of condemnation. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS, ANNUAL REPORT 86 (1968).
A further indicator of the annual take of California condemning agencies is the ac-
tual acquisition volume of some state agencies for which figures are available. See
generally STATE BUDGET OF CALIFORNIA FOR SUPPORT AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE (1969-
70) and (1970-71); CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, A SURVEY OF LAND ACQUISITION
AND DISPOSAL BY STATE AGENCIES (1969).
There is no statistical information available in convenient form describing the extent
to which property is being taken by local and private condemnors. In 1965, the Cal-
ifornia Law Revision Commission sent a request to about 50 counties, cities, and pri-
vate condemnors, requesting information concerning the extent to which property is
now being taken for various public uses and the anticipated need for the acquisition of
property for such uses in the future. At this time, we are seeking to determine what
information already is available in the form of published reports and unpublished mem-
oranda that would provide statistical information on past experience and future needs.
The Commission received only one response with any information. The County of
Marin indicated that it had spent $931,177.42 on acquisition of land and rights of way
over the preceding two and one-half years, an average of about $375,000 per year.
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surplus land disposition by all condemnors are not available, outright
sales of surplus land by state agencies0 in recent years have exceeded
10 million dollars annually,7 and leases of such surplus property have
accounted for an annual revenue exceeding 47 million dollars.' It has
been estimated that by July 1974, the major activity by the state as a
landowner will be management of state land and disposal of surplus
state property, with land acquisition being noticeably reduced.9
COUNTY OF MARIN, ACQUISITION OF LAND AND RIGHTS OF WAY OF MARIN (1965).
These figures are partial and do not necessarily constitute an accurate portrayal of
the extent to which land is being taken for public use in California. Moreover, they
are only circumstantial evidence at best of the magnitude of the problem of diversion to
private use of land taken for public use.
6. Each state agency is required by law to review its public land holdings an-
nually and report excess land (except tax-deeded land, land held for highway pur-
poses, and land under the jurisdiction of the State Lands Commission) to the Depart-
ment of General Services which then takes jurisdiction of all such land, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §11011. Next, the Department of General Services goes to the Legislature to
request authorization to dispose of the land by sale or otherwise, Id. A typical statute
as enacted usually provides:
The Director of General Services is hereby authorized to sell, exchange, or
lease for current market value and upon such terms and conditions and with
such reservations and exceptions as in his opinion may be for the best interest
of the state, all or any part of the following real property: [there follows a
list of the properties to be disposed of].
In 1965, disposal amounted to seven parcels, comprising a little over 70 acres (CAL.
STATS. 1965, c. 1526, §1 at 2652); in 1967, seven parcels of a little under 100 acres(CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1045, §1); in 1968, 14 parcels amounting to over 900 acres
(CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1318, §1 at 2491); and in 1969, 13 parcels of over 1,400
acres (CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1024, §1 at 1991).
The Department of General Services is required by statute to sell excess land first
to other state agencies that may need it, CAL. Gov'T CODE §11011. In practice, the
Department goes one step further and offers it to concerned local agencies.
[Als we receive from the using agency a request or a statement that they find
surplus to their requirements from real estate [sic], we report it to the Leg-
islature and we seek legislative authority to sell it. Then we advise all state
agencies that this land is to be sold unless some other agency has a use for it.
We then advise local government the same thing. Then we ultimately sell.[Statement by Mr. Vincent, Chief Land Agent, Property Acquisition Service,
Department of General Services, in California Assembly Interim Committee
on Natural Resources, Planning and Public Works, Hearing on Land Acquisi-
tion Practices 45-46 (1963).]
Superimposed on this disposal pattern is the requirement that state and local agencies
first offer the land for use as park land, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§54220-54224. See also
CAL. STREETS & H'WAYS CODE §118.6, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1331.
7. In fiscal year 1967-68, the Department of General Services sold 12 parcels for
$3 million and in fiscal year 1968-69, sold 19 parcels for $2,816,528. See STATE
BUDGET OF CALIFORNIA at 64 (1969-70) and 68 (1970-71).
The Division of Highways annually sells surplus land totaling about $9 million, and
the State Lands Commission sells land totaling about $150,000. CALIFORNIA LEGISLA-
TIVE ANALYST, A SURVEY OF LAND ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL BY STATE AGENCIES 17,
47 (1969). The Division of Highways sold 2,579 parcels of excess land in 1969-70
and 2,700 parcels in 1970-71. Its excess land inventory is about 11,000 parcels, val-
ued at $100,000,000. COMM'N ON CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND
ECONOMY, SUBCOMM. ON HIGHWAY RIGHT OF WAY, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON CAL-
IFORNIA DvISIoN OF HIGHWAYS ExcEss RIGHT OF WAY 5 (Jan. 1972).
8. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, A SURVEY OF LAND ACQUISITION AND DIS-
POSAL BY STATE AGENCIES 17, 36, 43, 47, 50 (1969). This total includes all oil and gas
royalties. The land rental alone amounts to $7 million.
9. Id. at 6. There is some indication that the number of eminent domain ac-
tions is beginning to decline. From a high of 11,518 actions filed in California su-
perior courts in 1967-68, eminent domain filings have dropped to 9,403 in 1968-69, to
8,122 in 1969-70, and to 6,937 in 1970-71. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
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This study reviews the law governing the right of a condemnor to
transfer to private ownership property which was originally taken for
public use, and examines the issues involved in developing a feasible
method of providing preferential treatment to the former owner in
such a transfer. 10 While policy considerations as to the advisability
of such preferential treatment are outlined, they are not developed
at length because they are not the primary focus of this study.
CoNDEMNoR's RIGHT TO TRANSFER PUBLIC PROPERTY
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Before the issue of subsequent transfer to private ownership arises,
land must be originally acquired for a valid public use." If the con-
templated use of the property is not a public use or if the condemnor
does not actually intend to put the property to a declared public use,
courts will simply deny judgment in eminent domain to the con-
demnor.' 2
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADnisNSTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA CourTs, Appendix
Table 16 (1971 and 1972).
10. There have been numerous complaints by former owners as to the nonex-
istence of a repurchase right. As a result, there has been continuing legislative con-
cern with the problem. See note 63 infra. The Los Angeles Daily Journal recently
carried the story of some Sacramento property sold to the state for $200,000 to be
used for state fair purposes, which the state approximately 20 years later is seeking to
sell, having received bids on 230 acres amounting to $7.3 million. The former owner
claims to have the first opportunity to repurchase the property at the original sale
price. See MacArthur, Affairs of State, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Nov. 24, 1970, at
6, col 1.
This problem transcends state and national boundaries. The Jerusalem Post recently
carried the report of the case of a man whose property was taken for a public use that
was later discontinued. The former owner sued to block sale of the property to foreign
investors for private residential purposes, arguing it should be returned to him. The
Israel High Court of Justice rejected his claim. Benin v. Minister of Finance (H.C.
282/72), reported in the Jerusalem Post, Oct. 28, 1971.
11. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d
206, 216, 463 P.2d 342, 348, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (1968); City and County of San
Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955); Consolidated Channel Co. v.
Central Pacific R.R. Co., 51 Cal. 268 (1876).
Practically, however, it is very difficult for a condemnee to challenge successfully
the right to take. The reasons for this difficulty are clear: Public policy requires a
presumption that actions of public bodies are proper; the courts are reluctant to inter-
fere with the processes of coordinate political branches of government. See CAL. EviD.
CODE §664. The burden of pleading, as well as the burden of proof, is on the defend-
ant who wishes to challenge the right to take. See, e.g., CONTINUINo EDUCATION OF THE
BAR, CALIFORNIA CONDEMNATION PRACTICE §8.31 (1960); County of San Mateo v. Bar-
tole, 184 Cal. App. 2d 422, 7 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1960); Lavine v. Jessup, 161 Cal. App.
2d 59, 326 P.2d 238 (1958). To show the subjective intent of the condemnor at the
time of the taking is almost impossible. When an abuse comes to light some time after
the taking, collateral attack may be barred by a relatively short statute of limitations.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §338(4); Capron v. State, 247 Cal. App. 2d 212, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (1966).[Clourts are willing to ask only whether the condemnor actually intends to
use the property for the purposes for which he claims to want it. This addi-
tional limitation on the exercise of eminent domain amounts to no more than a
rule which denies the condemnor the power to appropriate particular property
if he does not actually intend to use it for the purposes alleged. These juris-
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Conceptually difficult cases have arisen on the issue of public use
when the contemplated use itself permits or requires subsequent trans-
fer of the condemned property to private ownership. In these situa-
tions the courts construe the original taking to be for a valid public
use and the transfer of the land to a private user is considered to be
consistent with, or an integral part of, that valid use. These situations
include substitute condemnation, urban redevelopment, taking a physi-
cal remnant, taking a financial remnant, protective condemnation, and
recoupment. 13
In substitute condemnation, a condemnor is permitted to take prop-
erty from one person in order to exchange it for property of another
person which is needed by the condemnor. 4 For example, in Brown
v. United States,'15 creation of a federal reservoir was going to cause
flooding. The government condemned land elsewhere to replace
that of the individual displaced by the flooding. The condemnees
resisted the proceeding on the ground that the taking was for a private
purpose:
The plaintiffs contend that the power of eminent domain does not
extend to the taking of one man's property to sell it to another,
that such an object cannot be regarded as for a public use of the
property and, without this, appropriation can have no constitutional
validity. The district court held that the acquisition of the town
site was so closely connected with the acquisition of the district
to be flooded and so necessary to the carrying out of the project
that the public use of the reservoir covered the taking of the town
site. We concur in this view.' 6
In urban redevelopment, the condemnor is authorized to take prop-
erty by eminent domain for the purpose of eliminating or preventing
slums. This end is often achieved through subsequent sale of the con-
demned property to private individuals for private purposes, subject to
dictions hold that if the purposes for which the condemned property will be
actually used is authorized by the applicable statute, if that purpose is a pub-
lic use, and if the property selected is reasonably appropriate for the actual
purpose, judicial review of the condemnor's determination of necessity for the
particular property is ended.
Comment, Abusive Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain-Taking a Look at
What the Taker Took, 44 WASH. L. REv. 200, 233 (1968).
13. For a general discussion of the taking of a physical remnant, taking of a
financial remnant, protective condemnation, and recoupment see 2A NIcHOLS §7.5122
and Matheson, Excess Condemnation in California: Proposals for Statutory and Con-
stitutional Change, 42 So. CAL. L. Rlv. 421 (1969).
14. For a discussion of this area, see 2A NICHOLS §7.226 and Comment,
Substitute Condemnation, 54 CALw. L. REv. 1097 (1966). In California the important
statutorily authorized situations include takings for state highways, water, and dam
purposes. See CAL. STmRETs & H'WAYS CODE §104.2 and CAL. WATER CODE §§253,
255.
15. 263 U.S. 78 (1923).
16. Id. at 81.
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restrictions designed to accomplish the redevelopment. In Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Hayes'7 the condemnees attacked the constitutionality
of the authorizing statute 8 because "after the taking of private prop-
erty by the power of eminent domain . . . and after its redevelop-
ment, it [was] to be sold to private persons .. ."' Despite the al-
legation of lack of public purpose, the court upheld the constitution-
ality of the slum clearance law, stating that the purpose of eliminating
slums was a public use, "even though the use to which the property
is put after seizure is not a public use ... 20
Protective condemnation is the acquisition of property not physically
required for a project, but where such acquisition is made for the
purpose of disposing of the property subject to restrictions in order to
protect the public improvement.2' It is considered to be an adjunct
to and consistent with the public purpose of the public improvement and
is held to be a valid taking.2
Situations in which more land is taken than is specifically required
for a public project fall into the generic category of excess condemna-
tion.23 In the taking of a physical remnant, the condemnees entire
parcel is taken even though some portion thereof is beyond the needs
of the project. This occurs when that portion excess to the con-
demnor's needs has no value to, or would be a burden upon, the
condemnee because of its size, shape, or location.24
In People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Superior Court5
California expanded the physical remnant theory and approved the
taking of a financial remnant. Under this theory the taking of the
remainder of the condemnee's parcel of land beyond that amount
required for a project is a valid taking when the remnant has little
17. 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954).
18. The Community Redevelopment Law, CAL. STATS., 1951 c. 722 at 1922. This
law is presently found at CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§33000-33738.
19. 122 Cal. App. 2d at 786, 266 P.2d at 112.
20. Id. at 790, 266 P.2d at 114.
21. See, e.g., CAL. STREETS & H'WAYS CODE §104.3; see also Capron v. State,
247 Cal. App. 2d 212, 55 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1966); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works
v. Lagiss, 160 Cal. App. 2d 28, 324 P.2d 926 (1958).
22. Id.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See 2A NicHoLs §7.5122[1l]; Matheson, Excess Condemnation in California:
Proposals for Statutory and Constitutional Change, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 421, 430-32
(1969).
25. 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968). The dissenters
described the facts of this case as follows:
Needing slightly more than a half acre for a public use (65/100 of an acre,
to be precise), this governmental department seeks to take 54.03 acres of pri-
vate property which it does not need and cannot use.
Id. at 216, 436 P.2d at 349, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
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value (due to its size, shape, or location) and when the severance
damages are "excessive. '26
Recoupment is the taking of excess property for resale for a profit
when an enhancement in value as a result of the public improvement
is anticipated by the condemnor. It traditionally has been held not to
be a valid public taking.2 7 It may be argued, however, that in giving
approval to the taking of a financial remnant2s the California Su-
preme Court was giving approval to recoupment in that the court con-
cluded, "It is sound economy for the state to take the entire parcel to
minimize ultimate costs [emphasis added]. '"2 9
In California, the power of eminent domain may also be exercised
by certain entities to acquire open space or property which an entity
anticipates will be needed for public use in the future.31 The test of
the validity of such a taking is whether there is a reasonable probability
that the land taken will be devoted to public use within a reasonable
time period.32 If the taking meets this test, the condemnor may lease
26. The case before the court involved severance damages that would equal or
exceed the additional cost of taking the remainder. Id.
27. 2A NicHoLs §7.223:
In view of the fact that property may not be taken for a public use and then
turned over to private enterprise for nonpublic purposes, when property is
taken for the public use, there cannot at the same time be taken additional
adjacent property which it is not intended to devote to the public use, but
which is to be sold for profit as soon as the improvement is completed.
Taylor, The Right to Take-The Right to Take the Fee or Any Lesser Interest, 1 PAc.
L.J. 555, 576 (1970):
The difficulty lies in determining, in discrete cases, when government or one of
the government's auxiliaries is engaging in "sound business practice" and
when it is engaging in "land speculation"; and the judgmental factors of leg-
islatures, courts, administrators, and property owners have, of course, dif-
fered considerably.
28. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
29. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 213,
436 P.2d 342, 347, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1968).
30. "Open space" or "open area" is defined as:
any space or area characterized by (1) great natural scenic beauty or (2)
whose existing openness, natural condition, or present state of use, if retained,
would enhance the present or potential value of abutting or surrounding urban
development, or would maintain or enhance the conservation of natural or
scenic resources,
CAL. GOVT CODE §6954. Regional park districts may condemn for open space pre-
serves, CAL. PUB. REsouncEs CODE §5541. Cities and counties, however, may ac-
quire open space property by purchase, and the like, CAL. Gov'T CODE §6953. The
term, "or otherwise," as it appears in the code does not include acquisition by eminent
domain. See Comment, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and
Greenbelt Zoning, 12 STAN. L. R.nv. 638, 645-47 (1960). Furthermore, the authority
to condemn "public parks" [CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §1238 (3)] does not extend fully to
open space acquisition. See Ops. CAL. LEGIs. COUNSEL #17,885 (1969).
31. See 2A NIcHOLS §7.223[2]. California statutes authorizing taking for future
use include CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§1238(3), 1238(13), 1238(17); CAL. STREETS &
H'wAYs CODE §104.6; CAL. WATER CODE §§258, 11575.1. See also CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§7000, 7001; CAL. PuB. RESOURCES CODE §6808.
32. Cf. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472,
14 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961).
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the land for private purposes during the intervening time period 8 or
allow the land to lie unused.
The foregoing discussion has focused on situations where ultimate
private ownership is contemplated at the time the property is acquired.
Such acquisitions are considered to be valid as takings for public use
directly (urban redevelopment, leasing of open space, or substitute
condemnation) or to be adjuncts to takings for valid public use (fi-
nancial remnant, physical remnant, or protective condemnation). The
cases with which this study is primarily concerned are those in which
land is originally taken for a valid public use and thereafter the con-
demnor seeks to transfer it to private ownership because of changed
circumstances rather than because such a transfer was contemplated as
a part of the public use at the time of the taking. Changes in cir-
cumstance which would cause a change in use may include altered pop-
ulation trends in a school district, unanticipated engineering problems
resulting in a change of route, lack of projected funds to complete an
improvement, and mistake in the original acquisition of the property.
Under such changed circumstances a condemnor at present is free to
use or dispose of the property as it sees fit with few limitations.4
Statutes authorizing the unrestricted disposition of such property 8 -
33. 2A NicHoLs §7.223 [2]:
If a taking of the fee is made for public use, in good faith and without a
wholly unnecessary excess, it is no ground for opposing the taking that the
parties making it intend to derive a private revenue by leasing the land not re-
quired for immediate occupation (or by selling the surplus water when it is
not needed for the public use).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCE LAND ACQUISI-
TION By LoCAL GOVERNMENTS BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS AS AN AID TO POLICY 21
(1968):
Once land has been taken by eminent domain, it becomes the property of the
local government in fee simple, and may be treated as any other city (or
county) property, for use, for conveyance, or for any other purpose. Local
government's right to shift the use of the acquired land from one public
purpose to another is clear. Government has the right to alienate freely any
excess property condemned for a public purpose. It also has the right to sell
to private persons and at a profit, any land originally taken for a public pur-
pose, and which is no longer necessary. The only limits placed on this mu-
nicipal right are that there must have been no fraud or gross abuse in the
original taking, and that planned future use for public purposes was the true
reason for the original taking. [Footnote omitted].
35. In California, typical statutes authorizing disposition of surplus public lands
contain broad grants of authority. See, e.g., CAL. GovT CoDE §§190-196 (sale of ex-
cess land), §11011 (sale by Dep't of General Services), §§25520-25539 (sale by
county); CAL. PuB. REsotRcEs CODE §§6201-6225 (powers and duties of State Lands
Commission), §§7301-7424 (school lands), §§8101-8106 (university lands), §7361(timberlands), §§7501-7551 (swamplands); CAL. STmEETS & H'WAYS CODE §§1930-1934(abandonment of streets). NICHOLS states that it is not objectionable that:[A] statute which authorizes a taking provides that the municipal authorities
may sell lands taken whenever they determine that such property is no longer
needed for public use. Such power is latent in every taking, and is very dif-
ferent from a taking of land with a contemporaneous knowledge and purpose
that a definite and separable part is not necessary for the public use.
2A NICHOLS §7.223.
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whether it was acquired by condemnation, by settlement under threat
of condemnation, or by a wholly voluntary transaction-are liberally
construed.38 The holding of the fee simple absolute by the con-
demnor allows either devotion of the land to an alternate public use37
or diversion to a private use.38  For example, in Beistline v. City of
San Diego,3 9 the City of San Diego had filed suit to condemn certain
property for use as a municipal airport. Under this threat of con-
demnation, the owner conveyed his property to the city. Nine
years later, the city sold the property to a third person for pri-
vate purposes at a considerable profit. In an action by the original
property owner to rescind the sale or recover the profit realized
from the sale, the court held that, so long as the initial acquisition of
the property was for proper public use, any subsequent acts of dis-
posal were valid. The mere fact the city had changed its corporate
mind could not be deemed to restrict its power of disposition over
the property that it owned.40
In short, the law governing the power of a public entity to dispose of
land is fairly well settled with regard to all forms of acquisition for
all types of public uses. If the condemnor takes property intending to
put it to public use, the taking is valid. Once the condemnor has the
properly acquired title to property, it has almost plenary power over
the use and subsequent disposition of the property.41
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The question of whether or not preferential treatment should be ac-
corded to the former owner in some form of a right to return if his
36. "Although there is a paucity of reported discussions by the courts, they have
generally not attempted to construe narrowly statutes authorizing or implying capacity
to dispose of land." U.S. DEP'T oF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPmENT, ADVANCE
LAND ACQUISITION BY LocAL GoVERNMENTS BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AS AN AID TO
PoLIcY 21 (1968).
37. One instance of this rule can be seen in the case of Richelderfer v. Quinn,
287 U.S. 315 (1932), in which Congress authorized acquisition of certain park lands
in fee and dedicated the land in perpetuity to park use. Subsequently, Congress di-
rected by act that the park land be used in part for a firehouse. The Supreme Court
held that, despite the dedication of the land to park uses, Congress nonetheless held
title to the land in fee simple absolute and thus always had the power to change thal
use of the land and to devote it to another use.
38. See, e.g., Arechiga v. Housing Authority, 159 Cal. App. 2d 657, 324 P.2d 973(1958).
39. 256 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1958).
40. Id.
41. A federal study describes the power of a condemnor to dispose of land in the
following way:
The essence of the entire issue thus turns on the original condemnation, and
if this was in good faith, and within powers authorized by state legislature
or constitution to the local government all subsequent treatment of the land
which is allowed to the local government under its general rights as to its
public or proprietary property is also allowed to property acquired by the
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former land is to be diverted to private ownership is one of legal policy.
It is not the purpose of this study to present an in depth analysis of the
policy considerations involved in deciding whether a right to return
should exist at all. However, a decision as to the desirability of
a right to return cannot be made without reference to the policy con-
siderations. This section presents a brief summary of the major ar-
guments for and against the creation of a right to return.
The arguments that favor a right to return for the former owner in-
clude the following:
(1) A person grows attached to property which is in a real sense
unique. The law should reccognize his emotional claims to ownership
of the property. This emotional factor of attachment results from
a mystique about land ownership that the legal and philosophical defi-
nition of a "bundle of rights" does not encompass. Where land own-
ership, manhood, and wealth have been closely related, this attachment to
land is especially strong. The tie is often further strengthened by
bonds of birth and upbringing; a person commonly feels sentimental
or nostalgic toward the place where he was reared. In short, it is not
unusual for a former owner to have a lingering belief that the prop-
erty is, in a sense, still "his" and that, if the condemnor no longer
needs it, the owner should get it back.
(2) A person has invested in potentially valuable property and
that investment should be protected. When the property is returned
to private ownership, it is the original owner-investor who should realize
any speculative profit because, but for the government's intervention,
he would have reaped the profits (especially if the increase in
value is attributable to general conditions rather than activity of the
condenor),
(3) The American system of private property contemplates private
rather than public ownership and control of property; therefore, when
property is forcibly taken from the private ownership of an individual
and is no longer needed by the taker, it logically should be returned
to that individual.
(4) A right of return would discourage condemnors from fraudu-
lent acquisition of property for speculative or other nonpublic uses.
(5) A right of return would aid reimbursing the former owner for
some of his expenses which are not contemplated in the current con-
cept of just compensation.
condemnation method under the doctrine of eminent domain.
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCE LAND ACQUISITION 3BY
LOCAL GovERNMENTS: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AS AN AID TO POLICY 21 (1968).
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A summary of counterarguments to those listed above include:
(1) Persons desiring to repurchase property do so not for emo-
tional reasons, but for purely business reasons.
(2) If profit is to be realized upon a land transaction, that profit
belongs to the public; the private owner has not borne the risks and
costs that created the profit (often the result of the condemnor's ac-
tivities alone) and the public can better use the profit for public
rather than private good.
(3) The American system of private property ownership has given
way to public control of land use; the condemnor should be able to
dispose of property in such a manner and with such restrictions as it
deems necessary.
(4) Problems with fraudulent acquisition and just compensation
can best be handled by restrictions upon the right to take and by pro-
visions for adequate compensation, rather than by a right to return
which both would compel return even where the original taking was in-
nocent 42 and would compensate for losses in a haphazard, sporadic
manner.
(5) The condemnor has paid full value for the land and, there-
fore, as a matter of logic should receive full and unencumbered title
to the land.
(6) A right of return will place administrative demands upon the
condemnor and will cloud the title to property when the condemnor
seeks to dispose of it.
THE RIGHT TO RETURN
Assuming the need for a right to return, the characteristics of
such a right need to be explored and discussed. This section will
describe the concept of a right to return and the possible forms it may
take; the following section will provide a detailed discussion of one ma-
jor type of right to return, the repurchase right.
To What Form of Land Acquisition Should a Right of Return Apply?
In formulating a policy allowing an owner a right to return, consid-
eration should be given to the manner in which the property was
acquired by the condemnor. A right to return would certainly seem
essential when the owner's property was acquired by actual exercise of
42. While at present any profit goes to the public, there is no evidence that land
speculation has become a condemnor's goal. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible that
condemnors are affected by the knowledge that, should their plans change, they will
realize any profits obtained.
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the power of eminent domain.43  Most parcels, perhaps well over 99
percent, however, are acquired by negotiated purchase and not through
eminent domain proceedings.44 Realistically, these purchases are
often involuntary since the owner is compelled to negotiate and sell un-
der threat of condemnation proceedings in order to avoid the uncer-
tainty and expense of eminent domain litigation. Therefore, limiting
a right of return to property acquired only by eminent domain would
result in an undue narrowing of its scope and the exclusion of many de-
serving persons. 45  Such a narrow limitation might also increase costs
of acquisition for public entities since owners would be reluctant to
lose a right of return by agreeing to a negotiated purchase. Instead,
they might force the condemnor to take the property by eminent do-
main. Accordingly, some provision should be made to include pur-
chases or negotiated settlements made under threat of condemnation
within the scope of a right to return.
In 1969 proponents of California Assembly Bill 1510 recognized
the need for inclusion of those whose property was taken under threat
of condemnation within the coverage of a repurchase right.40  The bill
provided for creation of a repurchase right when the property was ac-
quired by eminent domain or under threat of condemnation. The bill,
however, defined the term under threat of condemnation thusly:
As used in this section, property is acquired "under threat of con-
demnation" when the property is acquired by a public or private
entity at any time after the public or private entity commences pro-
ceedings, which are pending at the time of the acquisition, to con-
demn all or part of such property.47
43. Almost none of the proposals for a right to return have gone beyond this.
See, e.g., 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1_410 (Purdon Supp. 1970) ("If a condemnor has con-denned a fee"); Ontario, Canada, The Expropriations Act of 1968-69, §43 ("Where
lands that have been expropriated and are in the possession of the expropriating au-
thority"). Contrast Surplus Property Act of 1944, P.L. 78-457, 56 Stat. 765 (return of
property "acquired" by the federal government).
44. Uniform figures are not available. Of the 8,589 parcels acquired by the
California Division of Highways in 1964-65, 8,278 were acquired by negotiated pur-
chase and only 311 by condemnation. CAL. DEP'T oF PUnLIC WoRKS, DiviSION OF
HIGHWAYS, ANNUAL RIGHT OF WAY REPORT (1965).
In the state as a whole, for all condemnors, once the proceedings have reached the
state of filing for eminent domain in superior court, the percentage of settlements
drops. For instance, in 1970-71, there were 6,937 filings throughout the state. Of
these, about half (3,551) were disposed of by settlement or otherwise prior to trial.
Another 2,339 were uncontested at trial, and some 353 were pending at the close of
the year. Thus, of the 6,937 proceedings filed in 1970-71, 694 were actually disposed
by contested trial. These figures were taken from JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMNIsTRATIvE OFFIcE OF THE CALIFORNI CouRTs 100, Ap-
pendix Table 16 (1972).
45. The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia notes the plight of the
property owner who has settled: "Should such persons not be entitled to the same
treatment as those against whose property expropriation proceedings were begun?"
LAw REFoRm COMM'N OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORTS ON EXPROPRIATION 119 (1971).
46. A.B. 1570, 1969 Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1969.
47. Id.
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Although broader in scope than a right of return that would be avail-
able only to persons whose property is taken by actual eminent do-
main proceedings, this proposed legislation seems somewhat restric-
tive because the phrase after the public or private entity commences
proceedings could be construed to refer to some formal act of the con-
demning body, such as the passage of a resolution of necessity, or
could be construed to require the actual filing of the condemnation
action before the right exists. In either case, this provision would elim-
inate a right of return for property acquired by purchase where the en-
tity had not yet instituted proceedings.
A more comprehensive model is found in the federal rules of taxation
relating to gains realized on involuntary conversions of property by
"condemnation or threat or imminence thereof. ' 48  The Internal Reve-
nue Service applies the following test which is both precise and realis-
tic:
[Tlhreat or imminence of condemnation is generally considered to
exist when a property owner is informed, either orally or in writing,
by a representative of a governmental body or public official au-
thorized to acquire property for public use, that such body or pub-
lic official has decided to acquire his property and the owner has
reasonable grounds to believe, from the information conveyed
to him by such representative that the necessary steps to condemn
the property will be instituted if a voluntary sale is not arranged.49
Of course, this provision does not cover the situation where an owner
decides to sell because an entity is merely considering his property as
one possible site for his project. In such a case, it is difficult to say
that the conveyance was involuntary. In any event, the principle is
clear: property acquired by condemnation or purchase under threat
or imminence of condemnation should be treated similarly.
It should be noted that at least one safeguard is necessary if
purchased property can be made subject to a right of return. As pub-
lic entities acquire property, they might attempt to extract a waiver of
the right of return from the owner or buy the right as a part of the
purchase bargain. 0 That the acquiring entity should not be allowed
to do this is apparent: the purpose of the right is to give the former
48. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1033 (a).
49. Rev. R. 63-221, 1963-2 CuM. BuLL. 332-333, modifying Rev. R. 58-557. For
the history of this provision, see 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§20.170 (Zimet & Weiss rev. 1965).
50. This speculation is far from fanciful:
In order to avoid the consequences and complexities of the Ontario provision,
some expropriating authorities in that province are, we understand, taking
waivers from owners with whom they settle after expropriation proceedings
have commenced.
LAW REFORM COMM'N oF BRTIsH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION 120 (1971).
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owner some form of future interest in the property that vests if the
land is not used as intended. To allow the condemnor to acquire the
right or secure its waiver would raise the cost of acquisitions to the pub-
liec and tend to nullify the right. Regardless of how unfair the bargain
might seem, the condemnee who needs money at the time of sale would
probably sell his right. The solution to this problem appears easy.
The right could be made nonwaivable and nontransferable to the ac-
quiring entity.- By similar reasoning, the right to return itself should
not be subject to condemnation.
When Should a Right to Return Become Operative?
Many proposals for an owner's right to return would allow the
right to arise whenever there is a diversion of the property to any use,
public or private, other than the use for which the property was ac-
quired.12  The apparent intent of such proposals is to make diver-
sion of the land easily discernable and to ensure that a condemnor uses
property as it declares it will; however, the effect of honoring a right
to return upon devotion to any use other than that for which the
property is taken is to unnecessarily restrict the condemnor's flex-
ibility by preventing the condemnor from diverting the property to an
alternate public use, when such a diversion might be both efficient
and desirable.53 Condemnors should be encouraged to devote property
already acquired to alternate public uses since this would conserve the
time and money spent in processing the original acquisition, avoid the
expense of recondemning the property for that alternate use, and would
limit the number of people dispossessed by condemnation. 4  There-
51. Cf. CAL. GOVT CODE §50307.
52. The MODEL CODE OF EMINENT DOMAIN §313, for example, provides for re-
purchase if the condemnor "abandons the purpose for which property has been con-
demned." A Vermont study's right to return proposal concerns property "no longer
needed for purposes of the project." 12 VT. STAT. ANN. §5678(a) (draft) [hereinafter
cited as VERmONT DRAFT ACr]. A South Carolina statute provides a repurchase right
for property not devoted to the purpose for which it was taken. S.C. CODE §25-53;
Cain v. S.C. Public Serv. Auth., 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d 177 (1952). About half the
relevant California legislative proposals provide repurchase interests in property which
is "not needed for the purposes for which it was acquired." A.B. 2299 and 2769,
1963 Regular Session, A.B. 2882 and 3317, 1965 Regular Session and A.B. 1914, 1969
Regular Session. See also 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §10410 (Purdon Supp. 1970); Land
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, §§127-132; and former CAL.A.RL CODE §4154, repealed CAL. STATS. 1968 c. 46 at 187. For a complete listing of
statutes granting, or proposing, an owner's right to return, see text at notes 62-70 infra.
53. This point also made in LAw REFORM COMM'N OF BRITISH COLUMIA, REPORT
ON EXPROPRATION 119 (1971). Contrast R.I. GEN. Lws ANN. §37-7-3 (1956) (first
priority to former owner, second priority to other public entities).
54. See, e.g., A.B. 343, 1963 Regular Session, A.B. 1719 and 2087, 1968 Regular
Session and A.B. 1570, 1969 Regular Session (providing that property "found to be no
longer necessary for public use" shall be subject to repurchase rights). See alsoSurplus Property Act of 1944, P.L. 78-457, 56 Stat. 765, providing for disposal to
former owner, land that "is not disposed of to government agencies."
A related but more difficult problem arises where the property is transferred by the
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fore, any right to return must distinguish between property that is put
to private use and public use, and the right to return should become
operative only when the property is to be diverted to private use.
Often the condemnor will expressly declare that it intends to quit a
project or that property taken is surplus to its needs. It is relatively
easy to identify a subsequent permanent disposition of such property as
a devotion to private use, and the right to return should become
operative in this situation. For example, the few existing statutes that
grant to a former owner the right to return of his property clearly in-
clude an expressly declared abandonment.5 5 However, when an inten-
tion to dispose permanently of the property is not announced, it may
be difficult to distinguish between property that is put to private use
and property that only appears so, but which is actually devoted to a
public use. For example, property may be properly taken to be ex-
changed with a private person (substitute condemnation) or to be
sold to a private person (excess condemnation, temporary taking, ur-
ban redevelopment). Property also may be taken and then leased to
private persons or simply allowed to lie unused (future use, protective
condemnation, open space). 6 Therefore, in the situation where the
condemnor does not announce its intention, the circumstances sur-
rounding the original acquisition and the subsequent disposal of the
land are significant.5 7  The problem of distinguishing between aban-
donment of public use and a public use that includes sale of land to
private parties is somewhat alleviated by the requirement that the con-
demnor state the authority under which it is acquiring the property at
the time of acquisition.
original condemnor to another public entity for the same or a different public use and
the transferee subsequently decides to dispose of the property for a private use. If the
right of return is limited to the first condemnor only, that condemnor could avoid it
by passing the property to another public entity for subsequent disposal. Leaving the
right to return unaffected by this circumstance, however, produces significant prob-
lems: Does the duration of the right begin to run anew upon transfer? What will be
the repurchase price? Will the new acquirer be subject to the same liabilities as the
original condemnor?
The most realistic solution to these problems is to hold all factors constant, making
no exceptions for the transferee. It will take the property subject to the right of re-
turn and, if it disposes of the property for private purposes within the period of limi-
tations after the original condemnation, it is placed in the shoes of the original con-
demnor. Although such a plan might work hardship where a transferee bought the
property at a higher price than that originally paid or was forced by circumstances to
discontinue the public use, such instances would probably be rare and worth the risk in
order to assure the sustained vitality of the former owner's right to return.
55. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971); 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §§1-410
(Purdon Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §37-7-3 (1956); Manitoba, Canada,
The Expropriation Act, S.M. 1970, c. 78, at 551; Land Clauses Consolidation Act of
1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, §§127-132.
56. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
57. For example, if property is taken for future use, it will be assumed that any
subsequent lease of the property for private purposes is pursuant to the future use au-
thority; however, if the former owner is able to show that the private lease has contin-
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Although related to the foregoing discussion of declared abandon-
ment and undeclared disposition of land, the following subjects will be
deferred for later consideration: the procedures by which the issue of
private use would be raised by the condemnee, the burden of proof,
the types of presumption, and the possible alternative remedies and
sanctions for the condemnor's failure to first offer the property to the
former owner prior to disposal.
Nature of the Right to Return: Easement, Reversion, or Repurchase
One key issue to be resolved concerning the right to return is
the legal form such a right should take. One way to achieve the objec-
tive of return is simply to limit the ability of a condemnor to take.
This can be accomplished by placing such stringent limitations upon
the right to take that the use of property for purposes stated is vir-
tually assured. A more practical method is to eliminate takings in fee
simple absolute and substitute the taking of either an easement or a de-
feasible fee conditioned upon continued public use.
Early eminent domain law actually preferred the taking of an ease-
ment rather than a fee by the condemning agency:
By the common law the fee in the soil remains in the original owner
where a public road is established over it; but the use of the road
is in the public. The owner parts with this use only, for if the road
shall be vacated by the public, he resumes the exclusive posses-
sion of the ground. .... us
This common law preference for an easement with return to the own-
er,59 however, has gradually been eroded by statutes so that now the re-
verse is true: the fee is the preferred estate for condemnation pur-
poses., 0
ued well beyond the future use period and that the condemnor has no intention ofdevoting the land to some other public use within a reasonable period of time, he will
have demonstrated actual devotion to a private use. On the other hand, if property is
taken for school grounds, it will be assumed that any subsequent sale of the property for
private purposes is a devotion to private use; however, if the condemnor is able to
show that the sale was actually pursuant to a change in plans which required its use for
substitute condemnation purposes, it will have demonstrated actual devotion to a public
use.
58. Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 10 U.S. (6 Peters) 202, 213-214 (1832).
59. See Taylor, The Right to Take-The Right to Take the Fee or Any Lesser
Interest, 1 PAc. L.J. 555, 573 (1970).
60. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. §1239 giving condemnors broad authority to
take a fee simple. The interesting evolution of this statute is traced in Taylor,
The Right to Take-The Right to Take the Fee or Any Lesser Interest, 1 PAC. L.J. 555,562-569 (1970). The courts have generally held that, where the condemnation vests a
fee interest, the fee is absolute and title does not revert to the former owner when theland is not used or ceases to be used for the purpose for which it was condemned. See
26 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain §147 (1966):[W]here land has been acquired for the public use in fee simple absolute by
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the former owners retain no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be
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The alternative of the defeasible fee has been tried infrequently;
however, in practical effect, it is virtually identical to an easement. 61
A third method of creating a right to return is to create a re-
purchase right in the condemnee. Under such a concept, a condemnee
would have the right to repurchase the land if the condemnor ceases
his public use of it.
In considering whether an easement, defeasible fee or repurchase
right approach should be adopted, a survey of various proposals
devoted to a different use without any impairment of the estate acquired or any
reversion to the former owners. If a condemnation proceeding passes the
fee to the land condemned, there is, of course, no interest left in the original
owner and, therefore, no reverter or nonuse or the cessation of the public use
(Footnotes omitted).
See also the cases cited in 30 CJ.S. Eminent Domain §460 (1965) and 2 J. Luwis,
EMINENT DoMAIN §861 at 1500 (3d ed. 1909). NICHOLS cites cases from 23 jurisdic-
tions for the proposition that:
[When] a fee simple free from any easements or conditions is acquired either
by purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, if the use for
which the land was brought or condemned is lawfully discontinued or aban-
doned, there is no reversion, and the corporation holding the land may leave it
idle, or devote it to a different use, or sell it in the same manner and to the
same extent as an ordinary private owner.
3 NICHOLS §9.36[4] (footnotes omitted). The California cases include Rio Vista
Gas Ass'n v. State, 188 Cal. App. 2d 555, 10 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1961); Newport v. City
of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 7 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1960); Arechiga v. Housing
Authority, 159 Cal. App. 2d 657, 324 P.2d 973 (1958). In Arechiga, for example,
plaintiffs filed suit to set aside the condemnation judgment contending that they were
entitled to the return of the property in question because the public project had since
been abandoned. The court held that this attempt to modify the title taken by condem-
nation on the basis of subsequent events must fail.
[Where the condemnation vests a fee, the general rule is that the property
does not revert to its former owner when it ceases to be used for the purpose
for which it was condemned . . . (citing numerous cases from other juris-
dictions).
When the judgment in the condemnation case became final plaintiffs were
divested of all interest in the property regardless of the purposes for which the
property might later be used.
159 Cal. App. 2d at 659-60, 324 P.2d at 974-75.
At least one jurisdiction, however, has gone well beyond the common law and re-
quired a reversion where the condemnor abandons property taken in fee simple:
[W]henever [a condemnor changes location], the title to lands, or to the
interest or estate therein, condemned for the former location shall revert to
the original owner, his heirs or assigns.
VA. CoDE of 1919 Eminent Domain, Ch. 176, §4379. The courts construed this
statute narrowly to require that the condemnor affected be a private company
[School Board v. Buford, 140 Va. 173, 124 S.E. 286 (1924)] and that the corporation
not merely discontinue use, but actually "move" from the property [Matthews v. Codd,
150 Va. 166, 142 S.E. 383 (1928)]. But see Lake v. Isley, 13 VA. LAw RFG. 600,
stating broadly that, when a public service corporation acquires property in fee simple
for a public use under its right of eminent domain and afterwards abandons the prop-
erty, the corporation may not dispose of the property which reverts to the former owner
from whom it was taken. The statute was repealed in 1962. Cf. Comment, Abandon-
ment of a Public Works Project-Landowners' Remedies, 24 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 366
(1972).
61. Such a fee reverts to the grantor if the public use is discontinued or abandoned.
See 3 NiCHOis §9.36[2] and the cases cited therein. Cf. Comment, Abandonment of a
Public Works Project-Landowners' Remedies, 24 U. FLA. L. RPv. 366 (1972).
Neither the easement nor the defeasible fee presents a practical possibility. Since
they are too ephemeral to value, the condemnor would be required to pay fee value for
the taking. Upon subsequent changed use, the property would automatically revert,
causing a forfeiture by the condemnor and a windfall to the condemnee.
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and adopted laws reveals that the seemingly most accepted form of a
right to return is a repurchase right. For example, a federal statute
providing for disposal of surplus property following World War II au-
thorized repurchase by the former owner of land taken during the war.02
Moreover, numerous bills have been introduced in the California Leg-
islature proposing a broad based, pre-emptive right in the former
owner to repurchase his former property when the public use for
which it was taken has been discontinued.6 3  Although all significant
bills have been defeated,64 some California statutes provide a right
62. See Surplus Property Act of 1944, §23, P.L. 78-457, 56 Stat. 765. This
measure was designed to return to the original owners property donated or seized in
wartime, when it became surplus. It was repealed by the Federal Property and Admin-istrative Services Act of 1949, P.L. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377, which made no specific provi-
sion for return of surplus property to former owners. It should be noted, however,
that following the repeal of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, several special laws were
enacted to return property to particular persons. See, e.g., P.L. 84-300, 69 Stat.
591-92 and P.L. 84-312, 69 Stat. 608-09.
63. In the decade from 1963 to 1972, for example, at least 15 bills to this effect
were introduced:
1963-Assembly Bills 315, 343, 1940, 2299, 2769
1964-none (budget session)
1965-Assembly Bills 2882, 3317
1966-none (budget session)
1967-Assembly Bill 2570
1968-Assembly Bills 1719 and 2087
1969-Assembly Bills 1365, 1570, 1914
1972-Assembly Bill 2110
These bills will be discussed in some detail below with regard to certain specific prob-
lems.
A typical bill would have added Section 1267 to the Code of Civil Procedure to read:Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, in any case in which
the State, county, city and county, city, district or other public entity or pub-
lic utility or any other organization or entity with the power of eminent do-
main has acquired property by eminent domain and subsequently such propertyis not needed for the purposes for which it was acquired and thereafter pro-poses to sell such property, it must first offer such property for sale to the per-
son or persons or owners from whom the property was acquired at a price equal
to the amount of the condemnation award. This section applies to property
acquired before or after the effective date of this section.
This language is taken from Assembly Bill 2299 (1963 Regular Session) as introducedby Assemblymen Britschgi and Pattee, before amendment.64. With two exceptions: Assembly Bills 315 and 1940 (1963 Regular Session)
resulted in the enactment of Water Code Section 43558 (see note 65 infra). AssemblyBill 2570 (1967 Regular Session), as introduced by Assemblyman Meyers, would haveprovided for resale to the original owner in Section 118.5 to be added to the Streets
and Highways Code:§118.5. No parcel of property acquired by eminent domain for the purposes
specified in Section 104 of this code which in its entirety if found to be nolonger necessary for such purposes shall be subject to public sale within fiveyears of the date of its acquisition, unless it has been offered in advance to the
former owner at a price equal to the price paid to such owner by the state
plus an amount equal to the taxes which would have been paid by such ownerhad the property not been acquired by the state. Upon completion of such
sale to the former owner the department shall transmit to the county auditor of
the county in which the property is located that portion of the price which
represents taxes which would have been paid had the property remained in
private ownership.
When such land is sold to a person other than the former owner, a recitalin the deed to the effect that the provisions of this section have been complied
with shall be deemed prima facie evidence that such is the case, and con-
clusive evidence thereof in favor of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for
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analogous to a repurchase right." A handful of other jurisdic-
tions have provisions enabling the former owner to repurchase property
taken by eminent domain. A Pennsylvania statute, for example, pro-
vides:
If a condemnor has condemned a fee and thereafter abandoned the
purpose for which the property has been condemned, the con-
demnor may dispose of it by sale or otherwise: provided, that if
the property has not been substantially improved, it may not be
disposed of within three years after condemnation without first
being offered to the condemnee at the same price paid to the con-
demnee by the condemnor. 6
value.
This bill was amended four times and was eventually enacted without provision for
resale for the original owner (CAL. STATS. 1967, Ch. 1723, §1 at 4295):
§118.5. No parcel of property acquired by eminent domain for the purposes
specified in Section 104 of this code which in its entirety is found to be no
longer necessary for such purposes shall be subject to public sale, unless an
amount equal to the taxes which would have been paid by the owner had the
property not been acquired by the state is transmitted by the department to
the county auditor of the county in which the property is located. The
amount of any payments made pursuant to Section 104.10 with respect to the
property shall be deducted from the amount required to be transmitted pur-
suant to this section.
The purposes referred to in Streets and Highways Code Section 104 include rights of
way, quarries, offices, shops, yards, parks, drainage, and view.
65. Government Code Section 50305, for example, provides that, in a few ex-
tremely limited cases (local entity owning 50% of the land within another local
agency), a local agency in selling or leasing its property must first
give any person who has occupied or used that property or a portion of it as a
lawful tenant of the local agency for not less than twenty-four months during
the thirty-sLx months next preceding the sale or lease, an opportunity to buy
or lease the property at a reasonable price or rental, within a reasonable time
after written notice to him ...
CAL. GoV'T CODE §50305.
Such a right does not, however, extend to an employee of the local entity. Id.
Business and Professions Code Section 11525.2 provides that if a city or county
has required dedication of land by a subdivider for a school district and
If the land is not used by the school district, as a school site, within 10 years
after dedication, the subdivider shall have the option to repurchase the prop-
erty from the district for the amount paid therefore.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11525.2. The section further provides for recordation of
the subdivider's interest. See the discussion, infra at notes 143-146. In 1961 Cal-
ifornia enacted a rather limited statute which provided:
If any land is acquired by the 22nd District Agricultural Association by emi-
nent domain for use as a site for a facility authorized to be constructed pur-
suant to Section 86.4, the land shall not be used for any other purpose. If,
after the acquisition of such land by eminent domain for such purpose, the land
is not used for such purpose, the association shall dispose of such land. In
such disposition, the association shall first, for a 30-day period, offer such
land to the original owner of the land at the price which the association paid
for such land.
Former CAL. AGRI. CODE §86.5 (enacted CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 21, §2 at 580). The
provision was transferred substantially unchanged to Section 4154 of the California
Agricultural Code (CAL. STATs. 1967, c. 15 at 83). The authorized purposes re-
ferred to in the statute are stadiums, arenas, pavilions, and other similar public build-
ings. The statute was repealed (CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 46, §4 at 187).
California Water Code Section 43558 provides that excess land acquired by con-
demnation of a water storage district must be offered for sale for 30 days to owners of
contiguous land at the highest bid price; a former owner has the preference over other
contiguous owners.
66. 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1-410 (Purdon Supp. 1970). The comment to this sec-
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This statute served as a model for numerous recommendations in
other jurisdictions. In addition, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and
tion states:
Under existing law if the condemnor condemns a fee and then abandons the
purpose for which the property was condemned, the condenee has no re-
versionary interest in the property. Starkey v. Philadelphia, 397 Pa. 512
(1959). This section continues and clarifies existing law in this regard but
goes further and sets forth exactly what alternatives are available to the con-
demnor if the original purpose of condemnation is abandoned. The prop-
erty must be offered to the condemnee under the condition specified and only
if the condemnee then refuses to repurchase the property can the condemnor
otherwise dispose of it.
This section is not intended to restrict a Redevelopment Authority from
amending a Redevelopment or Urban Renewal Plan after an area has been
acquired, nor to restrict a Redevelopment Authority from selecting alternative
redevelopers, all of which actions are done with councilmanic approval. See
Urban Redevelopment Law, 1945, May 24, P.L. 991, as amended (35 PS 1701
et seq.).
The notice procedures referred to in this section basically require service of complaint
and summons with alternative methods of service by certified and registered mail, or
posting and publication, if necessary. 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1-405(b) (Purdon Supp.
1970).
67. Helstad, for example, adopts the substance of this statute with slight draft-
ing modifications. See 0. HELsTAD, A SURvEY AND CRITiQUE oF HIHWAY CONDEMNA-
TION LAW AND LITIGATION IN T=E UNfTED STATES 259 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Helstad proposal].
The American Bar Association Committee on Condemnation Law has proposed a
Model Eminent Domain Code that contains a section identical to the Pennsylvania
statute. See Preliminary Draft of Model Eminent Domain Code §313A, printed in 2
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 365 (1967) (hereinafter cited as ABA
Model Code]. In addition, the Model Code includes the following subdivision:
If the condemnee shall claim that the condemnor has, in fact, abandoned the
project, the burden of proof shall be on the condemnor to disprove intention
to abandon when there has been long continued non-user. [Id. §313B.]
The Vermont Legislative Council's Committee to Study Condemnation Statutes re-
cently submitted a report and draft legislation which includes a similar though limited
provision:
§5678. ABANDONMENT OF PROJECT
(a) When a project for which property has been taken in fee simple
under this chapter is abandoned, or is altered in such a way that the con-
demnor finds the property is no longer needed for purposes of the project, the
condemnor may dispose of the property by sale or otherwise. However, if the
property has not been improved, it shall not be disposed of within one year
from the date of taking unless it is first offered to the condemnee, his heirs
or assigns at the same price at which it was acquired. The offer shall be
made in writing and sent by certified mail to the condemnee at his last known
address. If the offer is not accepted in writing by the condemnee, his heirs or
assigns within thirty days after the offer is mailed, the condemnor shall be
free to dispose of the property as he sees fit.
VT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT oF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY CONDEMNATIONSTATUTES (Proposal No. 29) (1969).
"Project," for purposes of this statute, means "all improvements or facilities which,
considered together with existing improvements of a like kind or nature, are necessary
to the acco.mplishment of apubic use." Proposed §5642(8). This somewhat nebu-
lous definition is explicated in the Committee's report: "The statute contemplates that
every condemnation shal occur i connection with some project which the condemnor
may define." VT. LEGISLATIVE COUNcIL, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY CON-DEMNATION STATUTES (Proposal No. 29) at 3-5 (1969).
The Vermont proposals of course recognize the parallel provision that, when the
condemnor ceases to put a less than fee interest to a public use, the interest reverts to
the owner of the underlying fee. Subdivision (b) of Section 5678 provides:
(b) When an easement or other interest less than fee simple has been
taken under this chapter, or under any other law repealed or superseded by
this chapter, and the condemnor finds such interest is no longer needed due to
abandonment or alteration of the project, the condemnor shall file in the land
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South Carolina have repurchase provisions of limited scope,6 Ontario
and Manitoba, Canada, have recently enacted similar provisions,"9 and
England, France, and Israel also have such provisions. 7
Working under the assumption, then, that the repurchase right is
a viable method of approaching the creation of a right to return, the
records of the town or city in which the property lies a certificate setting
forth that the use of the easement or other interest has been discontinued.
On the filing of such a certificate, such easement or interest shall revert to
the person who holds the reversionary rights to such interest. It shall be
presumed, in the absence of evidence establishing otherwise, that the rever-
sionary rights belong to the owner of the property which adjoins such ease-
ment or interest, or through which the same passes; in the case of an ease-
ment for highway purposes which lies between property of different owners
it shall be presumed that such owners are entitled to equal portions thereof,
in the absence of evidence establishing otherwise.
The New York Commission on Eminent Domain, at its November 1970 hearings,
received an informal proposal, which it summarized as follows:
If the condemnor abandons a project after it has acquired a title, the
former owners shall have the right to reacquire the property at a price
equal to the award they have received from the condemnor, together with the
interest thereon from the date of condemnor's payment.
N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON EMINENT DOMAIN, INTERim REPORT 31 (Feb. 1, 1971).
Apparently, no action has as yet been taken on this proposal.
68. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §37-7-3
(1956); and S.C. CODE §25-53 (1962).
The South Carolina provision in essence is limited to acquisitions of property
for state reservoir purposes. If property taken for such uses is not devoted to
those uses within five years after the taking, the former owner may repurchase
the property at the price he received less any damages sustained by the state's
taking and occupation, together with depreciation and special damages to the owner.
If the parties are unable to agree on the amount of damages, they are to be ascertained
by referees, preserving the right to appeal. If the former owner fails to exercise the
repurchase right within one year of the five-year limitation period, the state may give a
90-day notice, and the repurchase right expires at the end of 90 days. For a case
interpreting this provision, see Cain v. S.C. Public Serv. Auth., 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d
177 (1952).
The New Mexico provision is broader than the South Carolina provision, but applies
only to parcels in excess of one acre. The Rhode Island statute contains the most
general repurchase scheme of the three, but is a purely voluntary system, i.e., there is
no repurchase right.
69. Ontario, Canada, The Expropriations Act of 1968-69, §43:
Where lands that have been expropriated and are in the possession of the ex-
propriating authority, are found by the expropriating authority to be no
longer required for its purposes, the expropriating authority shall not, without
the approval of the approving authority, dispose of the lands without giving the
owners from whom the land was taken the first chance to repurchase the lands
on the terms of the best offer received by the expropriating authority.
Ontario did not give actual property rights of a residual nature to former owners of
condemned land; this was due to "practical" considerations which required that consent
of the "approving authority" be obtained before sale of surplus land. This would place
in the proper authority "full responsibility for the decision concerning the future of the
expropriated land, having regard to the just claims of former owners." 3 ONTARIo
ROYAL COMMSSION INQUIRY INTO CiviL RiGTrs, REPORT NUMBER ONE, at 1075-1076
(1968).
The Manitoba statute is basically similar to that of Ontario. See Manitoba, Canada,
The Expropriation Act, S.M. 1970, c. 78, §51.
70. See England, Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Viet., c. 18,
§§127-132, discussed in 10 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, Compulsory Acquisition of
Land and Compensation 223 (Simonds ed. 1955); France, Law No. 62-848, Ordon-
nance, Arts. 7-12, discussed in Herzog & Herzog, Comparative Study of Eminent Do-
main Procedures and Practices, N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1971 Re-
port 133-134 (1972); and Israel, the Planning and Building Law of 1965, discussed in
Benin v. Minister of Finance, reported in the Jerusalem Post, Oct. 28, 1971.
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remainder of this study will explore and describe the factors to be
considered in creation of such a right.
THE REPURCHASE RIGHT
The establishment of a repurchase right requires resolution of both
substantive and procedural issues. Several substantive questions con-
cerning the repurchase right will first be considered; then procedures
involved in the actual operation of the right will be examined. The
substantive items include: Who may exercise the right; should the right
be transferable, insurable or taxable; the repurchase price; the duration
of the right; and its relation to any common law rights.
Who May Exercise the Right
If property were always acquired from a single private owner hold-
ing an undivided and unencumbered fee simple absolute, it would be
clear that only the former owner should be entitled to exercise the
right of repurchase. This simplistic ownership model is the one upon
which most proposals for a repurchase right appear to be based. Un-
fortunately, the model seldom fits the facts. In this section resolution
of some of the issues raised by divergences from the single ownership
model are offered.
A. Disputed Title
The owner of condemned property is not always easily ascertain-
able. Several parties may claim independent ownership to the property
and the dispute may not be resolved at the time of acquisition.
If the property is taken in an eminent domain proceeding, the court, if
necessary will quiet title among the various claimants in order to de-
termine proper distribution of the award. As noted earlier, however,
most property is taken by negotiated purchase. In such circumstances
there may never be a binding judicial determination of title among sev-
eral claimants but it would seem likely that settlement of title would
occur during the negotiations. In any event, if an option to repur-
chase should arise in such a case, the adverse parties could be re-
quired to resolve their title dispute before permitting exercise of the
option to repurchase. Alternatively, where two or more persons de-
sire to exercise the right, each on his own behalf, the condemnor could
simply sell to the first person who accepts the repurchase offer, sub-
ject to later partition or allocation. Other solutions would be to permit
the condemnor at time of repurchase to interplead identified interested
parties or to provide for methods of arbitration to resolve the title dis-
pute.
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B. Successors in Interest
Even if legal title to the property at the time of taking is clear, se-
rious problems exist when the former owner is a business association
that has changed hands. In one case under the Surplus Property Act
of 1944,70a the former corporate owner of property had changed its
name, business, and ownership to such an extent that it was held not to
be a former owner within the meaning of the repurchase statute.71
There appears to be no feasible means to determine whether the suc-
cessor in interest of a business association should qualify as a former
owner, other than on a case by case basis.
C. Multiple Interests
Serious repurchase problems also arise if several parties hold joint
interest in the property. For example, if the property taken were held
in joint tenancy or tenancy in common, does one of the former owners
possess the right to repurchase, or must all the owners exercise the
right jointly? A similar problem occurs if the property were com-
munity property and subsequent to the sale of the land to the state but
prior to exercise of the repurchase right, the marriage is terminated.
The best solution to these problems seems to be to allow any of the
former owners to repurchase the property subject to a partition action.
If several owners combined to purchase the property jointly, they
would be given a joint deed. This resolution of the multiple owner-
ship problem will allow speedy execution of the repurchase right. If
concurrence of all the parties were required, one person might delay
and defeat the rights of other interested persons or demand an ex-
cessive amount for his consent. This solution also enables the right
to be exercised without the need for transferability of the right
among the various partial holders. The problems may be further eased
by a requirement that the repurchase right be recorded in order to iden-
tify all eligible parties."2
D. Vendor and Vendee
If there is an executory contract for the sale of land at the time the
land is taken, should the purchaser or the seller be entitled to the re-
purchase right? As in the disputed title cases, frequently a court will
70a. Surplus Property Act of 1944, P.L. 78-457, 56 Stat. 765.
71. See Fleming v. Charles L. Harney Const. Co., 177 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
cert. den. 338 U.S. 893 (1949).
72. The mechanics of a recording scheme are discussed below. See text accom-
panying notes 143-146 infra.
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make a determination of ownership for purposes of award allocation
where an executory sale contract is present. There is a substantial
body of law on the problem of ownership when such a land sale con-
tract exists at the time of condemnation,78 and it seems most practical
to permit ownership of the repurchase right to follow ownership of the
land for purposes of condemnation award.
E. Divided Interests
The right of repurchase should be granted where the estate taken
is a fee simple absolute; 74 however, whether holders of less than fee
simple absolute interests should be able either to purchase the fee or
to reinstate their interests upon repurchase is dubious. There are sev-
eral such common "lesser" interests that require consideration in any
policy governing repurchase rights.
For example, where condemned property is subject to a lease with
a long unexpired term, the dispossessed lessee may have almost as much
interest in reinstating his leasehold as the former fee owner has in re-
purchasing his fee. Nonetheless, it would complicate the repurchase
right enormously to grant the former lessee a right either to reinstate
his lease or, should the lessor elect not to exercise his option, to pur-
chase the fee. If both lessor and lessee decide to purchase, some deter-
mination of the more worthy and substantial interests would seem to be
necessary. However, a quantitative formula focusing on the length
of lease time that remained at the time of condemnation in order to de-
73. See, e.g., 2 NicHOLs §5.21[l].
74. The Vermont proposal for repurchase, for example, extends to property taken
"in fee simple." VEmvsoNrr DRAFT Acr §5678(a). Section 5678(b) declares that un-
needed easements or other interests less than fee simple shall revert to the holder of re-
versionary rights. The California bills generally referred either to "property" or to
"parcels" of property acquired by eminent domain, without further identification of the
type of interest involved. One bill referred only to "property," but included by implica-
tion the fee or any lesser interest. Assembly Bill 1365, 1969 Regular Session, as
amended May 28, 1969. This implication was subsequently deleted; leaving only the
"fee interest in real property" (as amended Aug. 1, 1969).
Similarly, the Pennsylvania statute applies only to a "fee." See 26 PA. STAT. ANN.§1410 (Purdon Supp. 1970). This terminology prompted a lengthy discussion by one
commentator whether it was intended to refer only to a fee simple or to a so-called
base fee, which reverts to the former owners upon cessation of the purposes for which
the property was originally appropriated, E. L. SNrrzER, PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT Do-
MAre 173-174 (1965, Supp. 1970). The commentator's conclusion was that the refer-
ence is really to a fee simple; for, if a defeasible fee were intended, there would be no
purpose in the section since the common law already provides a reversion:
Land condemned as a base fee reverts to the condemnee upon cessation of the
particular use for which it was originally taken. There does not appear to
have been any need to provide specially for this result to land not "substan-
tially improved" within three years after the condemnation. Hence, it seems
clear that this provision is applicable to land condemned in fee simple.
Id. at 174.
It should be noted, however, that the Rhode Island repurchase provision extends to
"any land or other real property or interest therein." R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §37-7-3(1956).
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termine allocation of the repurchase right would be difficult to ad-
minister.75 A further problem would be presented with regard to
the repurchase price. Since the fee is to be returned unencumbered,
the repurchase price is likely to be either the acquisition cost to the
condemnor or the present value of the fee interest. At the time the
property is acquired in most cases the lessor and lessee will have
been paid separately for their interests, and either would probably have
to pay substantially more than he received in order to acquire the en-
tire fee simple interest. It would be prudent to avoid these problems
by fully compensating the lessee at the time of the taking and terminating
all his rights to the property at that point, thereby leaving the ac-
quisition cost of the condemnor or the present market value as the
repurchase price to the former owner.7"
The same conclusion seems applicable to other interests less than fee
simple, such as easements, reversions and profits. One practical so-
lution is to ignore them-i.e., provide the owners of such interests no
right to repurchase and use either the total acquisition cost, including
the compensation awarded such interests, or the present market value
as the repurchase price.
An exception to this general rule might be appropriate for a life ten-
ancy coupled with an unexercised general power of appointment which
together constitute nearly a fee interest. The life tenant-donee at
the time of the acquisition would be the proper person to exercise
the repurchase right. Should he die without exercising the power,
the repurchase right could pass as any other general power passes or
reverts.
77
F. Secured Parties
The protections that a repurchase right is designed to give are aimed
at possessory rather than security interests. Accordingly, persons with
only security interests in condemned property should be given no re-
purchase right. For example, a mortgagee or trustee under a deed of
trust should not qualify for a repurchase right.
75. These difficulties did not, however, prevent the Surplus Property Act of 1944
from specifying that in the case of surplus agricultural property that the former owner
chose not to repurchase, the former tenant at the time of acquisition of the property
might exercise the option. P.L. 78-457 §23, 56 Stat. 765.
76. If the acquisition price is used as the repurchase price, however, it would, in
cases where lesser interests created a greater aggregate value than the fee alone was
worth [cf. People v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967)],
work to the disadvantage of the former owner who would pay the enhanced value and
receive in exchange the bare fee.
77. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§1389.1-1389.4.
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Whether security interests should be reinstated if the property is re-
purchased is a more difficult question. Condemnation awards are of-
ten adequate to cover all secured interests; however, junior lien
holders may sometimes be excluded from participation by exhaustion
of the award.78  This problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that
junior lien holders at times are able to obtain deficiency judgments to
recover the amount owing to them.79  Moreover, to allow reinstate-
ment might make it impossible for the former owner to secure financ-
ing in order to accomplish the repurchase.80 On the balance then, it
seems desirable that all secured interests be discharged upon the taking
of the property and not be reinstated upon repurchase.
G. Public Entities
The former owner of the condemned property may be a public en-
tity which acquired the property itself by condemnation only to have it
taken for a more necessary public use. Since there is already an elab-
orate scheme for disposal of surplus public property by first offering
it to other public entities, there is no need to burden this scheme
with a repurchase right.8" The original private owner should not be
able to exercise the repurchase right unless no public entity requires
the property. 82
Should the Repurchase Right Be Transferable, Insurable, or Taxable?
If a right to repurchase is granted, the former owner of the property
will have, depending upon the method adopted to set the repurchase
price, a more or less valuable interest in the property in the nature of a
right of first refusal. Whether this property interest is to be transfer-
able, insurable, or taxable must be determined. While the right appears
somewhat remote and contingent, it may not be totally incapable of
valuation and it may be sufficiently substantial to entail some legal
consequences.
The repurchase right should at least be devisable and descendable
upon the death of the former owner.8" Members of the family of the
78. But see CAL. CoDE Civ. PROC. §1248.
79. However, this will not be true in all cases. See CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. §580b.
80. Many large lenders will finance a real property transaction only if they have
a first lien upon the property. Commercial banks and savings banks, for example, can
lend money only on security of a first lien on real property. CAL. FiN. CODE §§1227,
1413.
81. See note 6 supra: Although this disposal scheme applies to state lands only, a
taker for a more necessary public use will almost invariably be the state. See, e.g.,
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1240.
82. See note 54 supra.
83. N.M. STAT. ANNi. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971) and R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §37-7-3(1956) provide expressly that the repurchase option is exercisable by heirs, While
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former owner are very possibly the persons who were dispossessed of
their property when it was taken. As heirs and devisees (or legatees,
since the right may be viewed as personalty), they should be entitled
to exercise the right in the former owner's place.8 4 Further, if con-
demned property was held by a life tenant with a general power of
appointment, the life tenant-donee should be able to exercise the re-
purchase right.8" Major drawbacks of descendibility and devisability
of the right are that it raises the spectre of existence in perpetuity and
presents the potentially insurmountable problem of allocation among
innumerable holders.8 6 However, this problem may be alleviated
simply by placing a reasonable time limitation upon the existence of the
right.87
Whether the right should be transferable during life presents a more
difficult consideration since allowing unrestricted inter vivos trans-
fer could entail undesirable consequences. One consequence of inter
vivos transferability is that in many cases it no longer would be the
condemnee who might exercise the right, but some stranger to the
transaction.88  Similarly, there is a possibility that some sort of market
in the repurchase rights would spring up. Since the ordinary con-
demnee might be willing to part with his right for a small bonus fol-
lowing his dispossession, speculators would be able to buy the repurchase
right at a nominal cost with the hope of making a windfall gain on
the discontinuance of a public use. Since one basis for the right of
repurchase is a notion of fairness to the condemnee who has been
forcefully dispossessed of his unique property, allowing him to transfer
his right of repurchase implies that he could have been adequately com-
pensated in money. Transferability thus appears to be incompatible
with the argument that a repurchase right would be based heavily on
the emotional aspects of property ownership.
On the other hand, an equally strong basis for the repurchase right
is the concept that any profit upon land which is not needed for public
the Surplus Property Act of 1944 made no express statutory provision for heirs
of a former owner, the legislative history indicates that devisability of the re-
purchase right was taken for granted. See Conference Report on H.R. 5125, H.R.
REP. No. 1890, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944).
84. This was the result under the South Carolina statute in Cain v. S.C. Public
Serv. Auth., 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d 177 (1952) (right descendable by will, absent
statutory indication otherwise).
85. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
86. "One can imagine problems expropriating authorities could face in the future
in trying to track down who is entitled to the benefit of the provision." LAw REFORM
COMM'N OF BRITiSH COLUmBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION 119 (1971).
87. See text accompanying notes 134-141 infra.
88. "This could mean that he could sell his right at any time to persons having
a commercial interest in obtaining the property, Is this really the purpose of such a
provision?" LAW REFORM COMM'N OF BRrnSH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON ExpRoPRIATIoNs
119 (1971).
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use should go to the former owner who otherwise would be deprived of
such profit. This notion sanctions free transfer of and speculation upon
the repurchase right.
Another consequence of complete transferability would be that the
condemning agency would be able to purchase the right. Because
the condemnor is almost always in the better bargaining position, it
would be able to obtain the right at a low price and thereby nullify it.
If a condemnor knew it were going to discontinue a particular project,
it could buy the repurchase rights in the relevant properties before an-
nouncing discontinuance. This latter problem could be avoided by
making the right nonwaivable and prohibiting condemnors from ac-
quiring repurchase rightsA9
Finally, an inter vivos assignment of repurchase rights is a practical
necessity if multiple owners are to negotiate their interests in returned
property. A prohibition of transferability would force a party wishing
to assign his right to transfer his interest after, rather than before, the
exercise of the right.
Should the condemnee be able to use his expectancy of security
in a credit transaction? Although the speculative nature of the right
would make it an unlikely security device in most situations, there
are some circumstances in which the probability that the right would
become operative would be great enough to enable a former owner to
finance a transaction by assigning the right as collateral for a loan.
There appears to be no compelling reason to deny use of the repur-
chase right as collateral for a loan.
Problems involving transferability of the right also arise in the area
of involuntary transfers. If the repurchase right is in fact a property
interest, absent regulations to the contrary it would be subject to levy
by creditors. However, the right would appear to be a very poor asset
to satisfy a judgment. Furthermore, if the property out of which the
repurchase right arises was formerly homesteaded or exempt from
execution for some other reason, it would also seem that the repur-
chase right should also be exempt.
When the issue as to whether or not a condemnee had an insur-
able interest arose under Section 410 of the Pennsylvania Eminent
Domain Code, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the right of
repurchase was not insurable and that the expectancy of an option to
repurchase was all that the former owner held.90 "While we might
89. A similar right granted to a former owner or lessee by California Government
Code Section 50305 is made nonwaivable by Section 50307. See CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§50305, 50307; see text at note 51 supra.
90. Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 435 Pa. 163, 253 A.2d 663 (1969).
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hold that an option to purchase is a sufficient interest to sustain in-
surance, the mere expectancy thereof is insubstantial and incapable of
qualifying as an insurable interest."'  This result seems appropriate
in view of the remoteness of the repurchase right.
Similar reasoning applies to the question of taxability. While dif-
ficulties in accurately assessing the value of the repurchase right do
not necessarily dictate that the right be nontransferable in business
transactions involving some element of choice to the condemnee, in the
author's opinion they do dictate that the right be nontaxable, both as
part of an estate for inheritance purposes and simply for purposes of
property taxation.
The Repurchase Price
Specifying a price formula entails the following considerations:
(1) Should the formula be based upon purchase price or upon fair
market value at the time of repurchase? (2) If the formula is based
upon fair market value at the time of the repurchase, how is it to be
determined? (3) If the formula is based upon the purchase price,
must allowance be made for improvements, property damaged prior to
return, partial return, severance benefits, and interest? (4) Under
either approach, should unpaid taxes enter into the formula? (5) What
is to be done in the case of a partial return of property? (6) What
is to be done in the case where there is an aggregation of remnants.
A. Purchase Price or Fair Market Value?
Whether the repurchase price should be determined by a formula
based on the acquisition cost or a formula based on fair market value
at the time of resale is an issue to be determined primarily by reference
to underlying policy issues. On the one hand, in a rising market, a
requirement that resale be at the original price of acquisition can cut
down spectacularly on public revenue.12  Moreover, since the former
Plaintiff's home had been taken by eminent domain. At the time a fire destroyed the
premises, plaintiff was still living there with the permission of the condemnor in order
to reduce detention damages. Plaintiff filed a claim against her supposed insurer.
91. 435 Pa. at 172, 253 A.2d at 667.
92. This factor was one which led the staff of the Assembly Committee on Local
Government to conclude that there should be no repurchase right, "A price formula
further restricts cities and counties from the selling of the land at the best price by
specifying a formula that supposedly predetermines a market value." Staff Memoran-
dum to the Assembly Comm. on Local Gov't at 6 (Nov. 6, 1969) for 1969 Open Space
Hearing.
It has been estimated that excess land sales by the Division of Highways average
three times their acquisition price. COMM'N ON CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT OR-
GANIZATION AND ECONOMY, SUBCOMM. ON HIGHWAY RIGHT OF WAY, PRELIMINARY FIND-
INGS ON CALIFORNIA DrviSON OF HIGHWAYS ExcEss RiGHT OF WAY 5 (Jan. 1972). How-
ever, information supplied to the California Law Revision Commission indicates that,
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owner may invest the proceeds received in the sale or condemnation
of his property in comparable property, he could already have earned
an increment comparable to the increase in value of the property."
Further, return at the acquisition price of property that has greatly ap-
preciated in value since its original acquisition may give a windfall to
the former owner who obtains the benefit of the increased property
value without having had the risks or burdens of ownership during
the intervening period. 4 This result seems especially unfair where the
rising market is itself caused by the activities of the condemnor. Fin-
ally, returning property at a price below its market value may be
deemed a gift of public monies."
There are, however, significant countervailing considerations. Some
of the costs of taking for a public project may be uncompensated, and
hence, fall upon the former owner.9 If his land is not required for
the project and he is permitted to recover it at the price paid for it,
any profit he makes through repurchase would serve to offset the dis-
proportionate cost to him of the original taking.97  Further, by allow-
ing the former owner to repurchase at the original cost, some compen-
sation could be made for the "involuntary" nature of the original tak-
ing.
The condemnor may presently retain any profit it makes in the sale
of surplus property, which serves as incentive to the condemnor to
take property in excess of his needs. By removing profit incentive,
an acquisition cost formula of price setting for repurchase should dis-
courage condemnors from taking more property than they really need.
In contrast, allowing a resale at market value encourages the taking
based on Division of Highways experience between 1964 and 1969, excess land sales
result in a net loss:
Cost of Excess Land Acquired $45,617,700
Return on Excess Sold 48,025,800
Overhead Cost of Sale 5,803,800
Net Loss 3,395,700
Letter from Robert F. Carlson, Assistant Chief Counsel, Legal Division, Department
of Public Works, to California Law Revision Commission, November 1, 1971.
93. However, this argument assumes that the former owner is able to find an
equally good investment, which may not be the case.
94. Basically, the condemnor takes the risk that the market will rise rather than
fall: The former owner reaps the benefits where it rises and otherwise ignores the
property. It can be argued that, since eminent domain is by its nature coercive, this is
where the risk belongs.
95. Cf. CAL. CONST., art. XIII, §25.
96. See, e.g., Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Emi-
nent Domain, 6 CAL. WESTERN L. R-v. 57 (1969).
97. This problem could, of course, better be solved by direct allowance of com-
pensation rather than by the haphazard allowance of profit in case of disposal. More-
over, in some cases, the owner may be better off after the taking than before. For
example, he may be paid an amount substantially in excess of the value of his former
home in order to acquire replacement housing. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §7263.
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of property in excess of the condemnor's needs for the purpose of sub-
sequent sale of the surplus at a value enhanced by the project. Thus,
the repurchase right based on the acquisition cost would function as a
supplement to the existing remedies for abuse of the right to take, for
if excess property were taken, the condemnor would not be able to
profit from it. Application of a market value formula would also
eliminate the economic value of a right to repurchase. The right
would represent merely an option or a right of first refusal. 8  Thus,
while the emotional factor considered earlier would be satisfied by
forcing the condemnor to give the former owner notice of the intent
to sell and the right to make a repurchase, the economic factor would
not be satisfied. 9
Finally, use of an acquisition cost formula would also aid the
former owner in exercising his repurchase right. Any substantial
change in the market value of the property (and such changes are
frequently caused by the condemnor's activity alone), may make it
financially impossible or impractical for the former owner to repur-
chase the property if he is required to pay the increased fair market
value.
On balance, it appears that if there is to be a repurchase right, the
better method of valuation is a formula based on the original acquisi-
tion price.100 This conclusion is not inescapable, however. 101  In rec-
ognition of this fact, the Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil
98. This is the case if the price is to be set by an appraisal. However, there is a
slight economic benefit, in theory, to a right of first refusal in cases where the price is
set at a public auction. For, assuming that a person need bid only one penny more
than fair market value in order to purchase the property, a right of first refusal would
save him one penny. On a more practical level, the dynamics of public auction are
such that the more interested bidders there are, the higher the going price will be, re-
gardless of any abstract "fair market value." A right of refusal would thus have the
effect of removing the former owner from the bidding and would perhaps assure him
of a better price than he would otherwise get if forced to bid for the property in open
auction. Furthermore, the knowledge of the bidders that their bids may be preempted
by an optioner would have the effect of stifling bidding, particularly if bonds are re-
quired. One study has noted:
The fact that the former owner has a right of option may, for example, dis-
courage some persons from tendering who would otherwise put in a bid. In
addition, some person interested in acquiring the property may, either in addi-
tion to or instead of tendering, attempt to buy the former owner's right (if,
indeed, it is transferrable in this way). As a consequence, the normal com-
petitive tendering system might be interfered with.
LAw REFORM COMM'N OF BRMSH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION 119-120
(1971).
Moreover, as a practical matter, the fair market value to others might be consid-
erably less than the value to the former owner if the owner has some adjoining
property, as may frequently be the case.
For a discussion of the methods of valuation, see the text following this note.
99. See discussion of policy considerations, supra.
100. The Surplus Property Act of 1944 favored the former owner by specifying the
sale price as the original acquisition price unless fair market value were lower:
The price to be paid for surplus real property sold under this subsection shall
be a price not greater than that for which it was acquired by the United
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Rights eschewed any final conclusion: 1°2
We recognize the problem respecting the price which the former
owner should pay for superfluous lands. On the one hand, it could
be said that the owner should have his land back for the amount
of compensation paid to him for it regardless of its new market val-
ue, if any. If its market value is enhanced by the work executed on
the non-superfluous expropriated land, the owner would have en-
joyed this enhancement if the expropriation had not included
the superfluous lands. Why should he have to pay for it when
these lands are sold back to him? On the other hand, in some
cases the land which turns out to be superfluous may have origi-
nally been necessary for the execution of the work involved and the
work could not have been constructed without it. If, by reason
of changed circumstances expropriated land becomes superfluous,
why should the former owner be entitled to obtain it for less than
its existing market value? There are no fixed answers to these
questions. Justice depends on the circumstances in each case.
Regardless which method of valuation is selected, the chosen method
should be relatively simple to operate. An analysis of the problems
involved in specifying a price formula for each valuation method, how-
ever, reveals that both methods have significant and complex prob-
lems.
B. Determination of Market Value
The market value of property in and around a public improvement
or project is usually quite volatile. Estimates of value can vary widely
depending upon who is making the estimate and at what precise mo-
ment it is being made. Market value is particularly susceptible to var-
iances caused by differing future plans for the property's use. What
seems a fair value to the former owner may not be the market value
to the condemnor at the time of resale. As a result, proponents of a
States, such acquisition price being properly adjusted to reflect any increase or
decrease in the value of such property resulting from action by the UnitedStates, or a price equal to the market price at the time of sale of such prop-
erty, whichever is the lower.
P.L. 78-457 §23(d) (3), 56 Stat. 765.
101. For example, in the case of a negotiated purchase, the parties may well agree
upon a compromise valuation formula in the event of a future diversion to private use.
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the British Columbia study is just the reverse:
If there was to be a repurchase procedure, we think the repurchase price
should be the market value at the time of the repurchase. Otherwise, if the
market value had gone up in the interval, the former owner would receive a
windfall. On the other hand, if the value had fallen, the former owner should
have the right of repurchase at the current and lower value.
LAw REFORaa COMm'N OF BRrsH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION 120 (1971).
102. 3 ONTARIO ROYAL COMMIsSION INQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT NumBEtONE, at 1076 (1968).
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market value scheme of valuation upon resale have tried either to pro-
vide a more objective means of fixing the value or at least to desig-
nate a competent arbiter of value.103
Although the Ontario study concluded that each case was unique on
its facts and thus specified no system of valuation,10 4 the ensuing On-
tario and Manitoba legislation provided a simple market value formula
based "on the terms of the best offer received by the expropriating
authority."'105 Such a best offer formula was also proposed by Cali-
fornia Assembly Bill 343 (1963 Regular Session). This proposal
would have required the condemnor to offer the property for private
sale or public auction, the highest bidder to take the property subject
to repurchase rights in the owner. The owner would then be informed
of the sale and of the price offered and accepted and would be given
the option to purchase at that price.
A British statute provides a different solution to the problem of mar-
ket price valuation. 06 If the former owner desires to repurchase, he
negotiates with the condemnor. If negotiation fails to lead to an agree-
ment, then "such price shall be ascertained by arbitration, and the costs
of such arbitration shall be in the discretion of the arbitrators.' 0 7
An analogous method was proposed by California Assembly Bill 2299
(1963 Regular Session) which specified the resale price as the fair
market value of the property "determined by three appraisers, one be-
ing selected by the entity, one being selected by the person or persons
or owners from whom the property was originally acquired, and the two
appraisers so selected selecting the third."'0 8  This method was also
suggested by a British Columbia study.10 9
103. The possibility of having the staff appraiser of the condemnor set the value
raises the spectre of unrealistically high appraisals.
104. The Ontario Royal Commission also stated:
Fixed rules cannot be laid down respecting the price at which superfluous lands
should be sold. As each case arises, the approving authority, or the Minister
or municipality (who are their own respective approving authorities), as the
case may be, should consider all the relevant facts when consenting to a sale
or selling expropriated land at a particular price. The owner should have a
right to be heard and make his claim.
105. Ontario, Canada, The Expropriations Act of 1968-69, §43; Manitoba, Can-
ada, The Expropriation Act, S.M. 1970, c. 78, §51. See also INSTrrUTE OF LAW RE-
SEARCH AND REFORM, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, WORKING PAPER ON EXPROPRIATION 1,
at 51 (1972).
106. Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, §130.
107. Id.
108. This system is comparable to that in arbitration, consisting of "two advocates
and one appraiser."
109. LAw REFORM COMM'N OF BnrnsH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRATION 120
(1971):
An alternative would be to have the price determined by the general arbitra-
tion tribunal on the basis of current market value, but for such a procedure
to be workable it would have to be binding upon both parties or at least con-
fer an option on the former owner for a limited time to buy at that price.
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C. Variance From Purchase Price
The problems of valuation are largely absent where the measure of
the repurchase price is simply the original cost of acquiring the prop-
erty. It is partly for the simplicty of this method, and partly because
of the policy considerations in favor of it, that most proposals have
focused on the amount of the acquisition cost as the repurchase price. 110
The purchase price formula, however, is subject to problems which
are, while not peculiar to it, complicating factors. These problems
include the extent to which improvements, waste, partial return, sev-
erance, set-off, and interest should cause a variance from the original
purchase price, and how they are to be valued."' The determination
of present market value would take most of these factors into account
automatically.
(a) Improvements. If the property in question has been sub-
stantially improved by the condemnor before being devoted to private
use, should this affect the repurchase price and, if so, in what man-
ner?" 2  Several proposals specifying repurchase at the price of ac-
quisition have avoided the improvement problem by limiting the right
to repurchase to those situations where the property has not been im-
proved by the condemnor. 13  For example, one California proposal
provided that the property must be offered for resale to the person
from whom it was acquired only "if it is in the same condition as it
was at the time of acquisition."" 4  These proposals, however, do not
account for the possibility that the condemnor might make some minor
improvement in order to escape the resale duty. A Pennsylvania stat-
110. Included are the former federal statute (see note 100 supra), the former
California Agricultural Code provision (see note 65 supra), the Pennsylvania statute,
the New Mexico statute, the Helstad and A.B.A. proposals (see note 67 supra), andA.B. 2110, 1972 Regular Session (before 10 years), A.B. 1365, 1969 Regular Session,A.B. 2087, 1968 Regular Session, A.B. 3317, 1965 Regular Session, A.B. 2769, 1963
Regular Session, and A.B. 2299, 1963 Regular Session (before 10 years).111. Under the French provision (see note 70 supra), the new price may not ex-
ceed the old price, "adjusted by certain factors." HIIZOo & HERZOG, COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDUREs AND PRACTicEs, N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, 1971 REPORT 133-134 (1972). N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp.1971) sets the repurchase price at the price paid plus six percent per annum, less the
amount of any liens incurred during the time the property was held by the condemnor.
112. The South Carolina statute, while dealing with possible damages to the land,
overlooked the possibility of improvements. The issue arose in Cain v. S.C. Public
Serv. Auth., 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d 177 (1952), but the court did not resolve theissue because it was not addressed by the pleadings. 222 S.C. at -, 72 S.E.2d at 189.
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 provided that the acquisition price be "adjusted to
reflect any increase or decrease in the value of such property resulting from action by
the United States." See note 100 supra. Presumably this would include improvements
made on the property. But see Seiden v. Larson, 188 F.2d 661 (1951), cert. den., 341
U.S. 950} (1951).
113. Language taken from the VERMONT DRAFT AcT §5678(a) (emphasis added).
114. A.B. 2882, 1965 Regular Session; see also A.B. 2769, 1963 Regular Session.
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ute attempts to solve this problem by providing the repurchase right
"if the property has not been substantially improved." 115
Nevertheless, the whole approach of sidestepping the problem seems
shortsighted. If a right of the former owner is to exist at all, it should
exist regardless of whether or not the condemnor has added to the
value of the land. The issue is not whether the right ceases in the
face of a public improvement, but whether the price must be redeter-
mined if the property has been improved and then devoted to a pri-
vate purpose. It is suggested that, if a public entity has improved the
land, it should be reimbursed to the extent of the amortized cost of the
improvement. The improvement, however, may be of little value to
the former owner and, in fact, its cost may prompt him not to purchase
the property.
(b) Property damaged prior to return. On occasion, the condem-
nor may damage rather than improve the property. This can occur
intentionally or inadvertently. For example, the condemnor may use
the property as a means of temporary access 16 to the project during
construction and thus clear a roadway which is useless for other pur-
poses; or the property may be needed for its sand, gravel, rock, fill, or
lumber or for dumping and depositing. 117  The case of waste should
be no different from the case of improvement. The repurchase price
should simply be the price at which the property was acquired less
the actual value of natural resources removed and the loss in value re-
sulting from waste generally. In the latter case, to avoid irreconcilable
valuation disputes, the valuation could be made by an independent ap-
praiser selected by the condemnor" 8 or as suggested in a South
Carolina statute, by referees, preserving a right to appeal." 0
(c) Severance damages and set-off benefits. The purchase price
method of valuation is subject to one unique complication. Where
severance damages and special benefits were involved in determining
115. 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1-410 (Purdon Supp. 1970) (emphasis added); see also
Helstad proposal §216(2) and A.B.A. Model Code §313A.
116. See generally CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1238. Note that often in these situa-
tions, the condemnor will only acquire a temporary interest that would terminate when
the temporary use was over.
117. The Surplus Property Act of 1944 provided that the acquisition price be
"adjusted to reflect any increase or decrease in the value of such property resulting from
action by the United States" see notes 100 and 112, supra.
118. There is some question whether nonstaff appraisers are actually "indepen-
dent" in the sense of being "impartial." The condemnor would have the ability to
choose appraisers with known "conservative" or known "liberal" valuation tendencies.
Short of adopting a complex valuation system of the types proposed for determining
market value, this problem appears insoluble.
119. S.C. CODE §25-53 (1962).
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the original acquisition price of the property, how should they be
treated in determining the repurchase price?
If only part of the owner's original property was taken by the con-
demnor and the owner was awarded severance damages for the re-
mainder, it seems fair that, when all the property taken is returned
to the owner, he be required to repay at least a part of any severance
damages received.'20 This results from analysis of the fact that sev-
erance damages are intended to compensate the owner for damages to
the remainder, since the remainder is made whole again, the repur-
chaser is likely not suffering the entire injury for which damages were
awarded. This reasoning is applicable even where the owner has sold
the remainder at its fair market value in the intervening period, for he
will have realized the severance bonus.
In cases where there is only a partial return of property taken, the
portion returned may not suffice to make the remainder whole, or it
may only partially diminish the severance damage. In these situa-
tions, as well as in the situation where return of all the property taken
does not Wholly compensate the former owner for his severance in-
jury, some computation of the reduction of severance damages is needed.
The total amount of severance damages is easily determinable if origi-
nally there was a trial in which specific findings of value were made. 1 '
This base, however, will often not be available in cases which are set-
tled by negotiation or stipulated judgment without indication of the
relative values of the property taken and the damage to the remainder.
In such situations, it will be necessary for an appraiser to determine
the relative value of the property at the time of acquisition and return
in order to ascertain the extent to which severance damage will be
mitigated by the partial return. Appraisers involved in the original
acquisition, if still available, should logically be the appraisers in this
situation, for they are presumably familiar with the values and ele-
ments of damage that affected the original compensation.
Fortunately, only severance damages actually received need be in-
cluded in the valuation of the repurchase price. Damages that have
been off-set by anticipated benefits should not be included unless,
and to the extent that, anticipated benefits never materialized. The
reason for the exclusion of special benefits from the computation of
120. Assembly Bill 2087, 1968 Regular Session, provides that property must be
offered to the former owner "at a price equal to the price, including any severance
damages, paid to such owner by the condemnor . . . ." (as amended July 15, 1968).
121. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1248 provides that the trier of fact
must ascertain and assess individually the value of the property taken [§1248(1)],
severance damages to the remainder [§1248(2)], and set-off due to special benefits to
the remainder [§1248(3)]. CAL. CoDn Civ. PRoc. §1248,
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repurchase price is that they represent the set-off of benefits never
realized against damages never received. 2 ' Since the object of in-
cluding severance damages in the repurchase price is to equalize any
windfall to the owner, special benefits operate as an automatic equal-
izer, which do not generally need to be considered further. However,
in case of a partial return of property, it is possible that severance
damages are still present while benefits have disappeared. 123  In such
a situation, it would be appropriate to decrease the purchase price by
the loss in benefits.
(d) Interest. There have also been proposals to add to the repur-
chase price the amount of interest that has accrued on the original
award or purchase price. ' 2  The underlying concept is that since the
condemnee has had use of the award money during the intervening
period, the condemnor should be entitled to the interest accrued on
the award. Moreover, the condemnor may receive no rent or other in-
come from the property while the condemnee has the opportunity to earn
interest or other income on the award. If the condennee is to be
granted the increased value of the property, this value should be off-
set against the interest.
However, while the condemnee has had the award money, he has
not had his property. On the other hand, the condemnor has had the
use of the property, the value of which use may exceed any interest on
the award. To require interest to be repaid on the award is to de-
prive the condemnee of income both from the property and from the
award-giving both to the condemnor-which is an unfair result.
122. Since the time of acquisition, the condemnor has changed its plans, and the
property being returned is no longer needed. In some cases, this will mean the im-
provement from which the benefits were to come may never have been completed and
therefore there are no benefits. In any event, the former owner is merely being re-
turned to the position of neighboring landowners who have not had to pay for any
benefits their property may have received as a consequence of the condemnor's ac-
tivities, and it seems unnecessary and unfair to make the repurchasing owner pay, as a
part of the repurchase price, severance damages previously offset against benefits.
123. Typical of this situation is where property is taken for a freeway interchange.
In the original proceeding, damages caused by proximity to the freeway are offset
against benefits conferred by the creation of an interchange. If the interchange is
deleted from the plans and property returned but the freeway goes through, the sever-
ance damages will remain but without the offsetting benefits.
124. See, e.g., A.B. 1365, 1969 Regular Session, as amended August 1, 1969:
The property is to be offered first to the owner from whom it was acquired
or his heirs or devisees at a price equal to the following amount:
(a) The original price paid by the city or city and county.
(b) * * *
(c) Plus reasonable interest on the original purchase price, as determined by
the legislative body of the city or city and county.
For a similar provision, see A.B. 2110, 1972 Regular Session. See also proposal in
NEw YoRK STATE COmmIsSION ON EMINENT DoMAmN, INTErIM REPORT (Feb. 1, 1971)
at 31: repurchase price to be acquisition price "together with interest thereon from
the date of a condemnor's payment." Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971)
(6% per year added to purchase price).
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D. Unpaid Taxes
Publicly owned property is not taxable. 12  Thus, when a public
entity takes property from private ownership, such property is removed
from the local tax base. The extensive state condemnation program
has, for this reason, produced strong political pressure from local en-
tities to require, upon the property's return to private ownership, pay-
ment of back taxes for the period when it was out of private ownership.
One result of this pressure was that one California bill that began as
a repurchase proposal ended as a statute requiring that taxes be paid
to the county auditor where the property is located, upon sale of the
property. 126 Also as a result of this political pressure, half the Cali-
fornia bills proposing a repurchase right, and almost all those specify-
ing the measure of value as the acquisition price, have included a pro-
vision that taxes are to be added to the repurchase price.127
Where a market value price formula is used, there appears to be
no reason beyond aiding local taxpayers at the expense of a former
owner for requiring a former owner to pay taxes on property that
he has neither owned nor had the use of. Accordingly, any such pro-
vision should be eliminated.
If a purchase price valuation formula is used, however, it is appro-
priate to add unpaid back taxes to the price. Since the former owner
will realize any available speculative value on the property, he should
pay the amounts he would have been required to pay in order to realize
the increased value had he held the land.
E. Partial Return
A more difficult valuation problem is presented where the condemnor
takes a parcel, devotes part of it to a public use, and then seeks to
125. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §1: property "such as may belong to this State, or to
any county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this State shall be exempt
from taxation. .. ."
126. For a description of the demise of A.B. 2570, 1967 Regular Session, see
note 64 supra.
127. A.B. 2110, 1972 Regular Session, A.B. 1570 and 1365, 1969 Regular Session,
A.B. 2087 and 1719, 1968 Regular Session, A.B. 2882, 1965 Regular Session, and A.B.
2769, 1963 Regular Session all provide basically that the property shall be offered in
advance to the former owner from whom it was acquired at a price equal to the price
paid to such owner by the condemnor plus an amount equal to the taxes which would
have been paid by such owner had the property not been acquired by the condemnor.
One exception to the general rule that a bill requiring resale at acquisition price
also requires unpaid taxes to be added is A.B. 3317, 1965 Regular Session, which pro-
vides simply that the property "shall be transferred back to the person from whom it
was taken for a price equal to the amount of the condemnation award, if such a person
requests a transfer."
There is continuing pressure to return publicly held property to private ownership,
thus enlarging the tax base. A recent report of California's "Little Hoover Commis-
sion," served to strengthen this pressure. Cf. Comn'n on California State Govern-
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dispose of the remainder.'28 As with improvements, some repur-
chase proposals dodge the issue and provide a right of repurchase only
if the whole parcel is subsequently devoted to a private use.' 29  These
proposals invite token use of a portion to avoid the repurchase
right and thus deny owners the right to return of their property in a
large number of cases. The owner's repurchase right should be inde-
pendent of the condemnor's decision to dispose of all or part of a
parcel-only valuation should be affected.
The South Carolina statute specifically incorporates the right to re-
purchase merely a portion of property taken but not devoted to public
use.1 0 Likewise, two California bills recognized that partial return is
as important as return of the whole parcel and provided a repur-
chase right if the condemnor "determines that such property, or any
part therof, is no longer necessary for the public use for which the
property was acquired."'' These bills however, provided no
method to measure the value of the part returned. The obvious al-
ternatives are either to use present market value or to attempt to estimate
the value that the unusued portion would have had at the time of
taking.
The easier solution would appear at first to be use of the present
market value in case of a sale of part of the property taken; 32 how-
ever, the condemnor might attempt to force a market value test in
every case by retaining a small portion of the parcel for public use
and selling the rest. This possibility could be obviated by specifying
the price formula to be either the acquisition cost of the parcel minus
mental Organization, Subcomm. on Highway Right of Way, Preliminary Findings on
California Division of Highways Excess Right of Way (Jan. 1972) (indicating that a
large inventory of surplus property is unnecessarily being held by the state) and S.B. 53,
CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1331 (requiring prompt return of excess property to private owner-
ship).
128. For a related problem, see text accompanying note 133 infra.
129. A.B. 1719, 1968 Regular Session and A.B. 1570, 1969 Regular Session, for
example, provided the right of repurchase only for a parcel "which in its entirety is
found to be no longer necessary for public use . . . ." The Surplus Property Act of
1944 provided that the former owner shall be entitled to purchase the surplus property
in substantially the identical tract as when acquired from such person. P.L. 78-457,
§23 (d) (1) (A), 56 Stat. 765.
130. S.C. CODE §25-53 (1962). See Cain v. S.C. Public Serv. Auth. 222 S.C. 200,
207, 72 S.E.2d 177, 185-186 (1952).
131. The two bills were limited in application. A.B. 1914, 1969 Regular Session,
while extending to all condemnors, provided merely for notification of the former
owner. A.B. 2087, 1968 Regular Session, as amended June 27, 1968, is limited to
takings in eminent domain by the governing board of any school district.
132. One way to determine present market value is appraisal by mutual agreement.
A.B. 2087, 1968 Regular Session, provides:
Where a part of a parcel is offered in advance to a former owner, the price
shall be determined by an appraisal made pursuant to mutual agreement of the
governing board of the district and the former owner. . ..
Another method is appraisal made by the appraiser of condemnor's or condemnee's
choice.
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the market value of the portion retained or the value the returned por-
tion would have had at the time of taking. Appraisal could be made
by an independent appraiser.
F. Aggregation of Multiple Parcels
After acquisition of a parcel for an improvement, a condemnor of-
ten finds that it holds an unmarketable and valueless remnant. By
combining several such remnants, however, the condemnor may be
able to create a new parcel of value and marketability. When this
situation occurs, each of the former property owners involved may de-
sire to purchase either the whole parcel or, at least, the portion that
once was his.
This situation presents several problems previously discussed in
other contexts and additional new problems. 133 If some or all of the
former owners desire to repurchase, the condemnor would either have
to sell to one or interplead all such owners, leaving determination of
their proportionate interests to the courts or to arbitration. If the
sale price is to be the original acquisition cost, there must be a post
facto determination of the original acquisition cost of each fragment
to be returned. If the sale price is to be the present market value,
the combined parcels can be valued either separately or as a whole.
If valued separately or if an acquisition cost formula were used, the
condemnor would lose any "bonus value" it might have realized by
assembling the disparate parcels and, hence, would have no motive to
engage in this practice.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to require a condemnor to
offer to sell each surplus parcel to the former owner. The parcels not
purchased could subsequently be combined for sale on the open mar-
ket. Of course, this raises the possibility that a former owner will re-
purchase his property at nominal cost in order to hold it for specula-
tive purposes since his parcel may be essential to development of the
remaining property.
As can be seen from the above, determination of a repurchase
pricing method involves many considerations. There is a policy con-
sideration as to whether the condemnee or condemnor should benefit
from any increase in value. There is the difficulty in determining
market value if that method is chosen. There are the problems of
value adjustment due to improvements, waste, severance damages, in-
terest, taxes, partial return, and aggregation if the acquisition price
133. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
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method is utilized. However, since one of the major reasons for hav-
ing the right is to allow the condemnee to gain economic benefit when
the land is not used, the acquisition price method seems the better in
spite of the fact that it will require a detailed set of rules to provide for
necessary value adjustments in the base acquisition cost.
Duration of the Repurchase Right
It may be argued that, in theory, if a condemnor takes property for
a public use, the right to repurchase the property should be exercisable
whenever it is no longer used for a public purpose.18 4  However, a
long or indefinite duration of the right, from the time the property is
acquired, would aggravate some of the problems inherent in a repur-
chase right. Because of the increased possibility of improvements or
damage to the property, it would make setting the repurchase price
more difficult. Furthermore, the administrative cost of keeping track
of the holders of the repurchase right would be increased, especially if
free inter vivos transferability is to be allowed. Most proposals, there-
fore, have specified a maximum time limit for existence of the right,
ranging from one' 35 to ten'8 6 years. The Pennsylvania statute and
statutes imitating it have set a duration of three years. 137 The New
134. California Agricultural Code Section 4154 (repealed CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 45,§4 at 187) provided that, if land is acquired for a specified purpose and not used for
such, that the land must first be offered to the original owner. A.B. 343, 1963 Regular
Session, likewise contained no time limitation. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §37-7-3 (1956)
provides for repurchase "whenever" it becomes surplus.
The Manitoba and Ontario statutes also contain no limits, a defect that subjects them
to the criticism of the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia. See LAw REFORm
Comm'N OF BRrrISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRTIONA 118 (1971).
135. 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 5678(a) (draft) provides that property taken "shall not
be disposed of within one year from the date of taking unless it is first offered to the
condenee ... ." See also INSTrrtuE OF LAW RE SEARCH AND REFORM, UNIvERsrrY OF
ALBERTA, WORMNG PAPER oN EXPROPRIATION II, at 50 (1972).
136. The British Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 127, specified
that superfluous property must be disposed of by the condemnor within 10 years of
the time authorized for completion of the project, being first offered to the former
owner.
A.B. 1365, 1969 Regular Session, as amended Aug. 1, 1969, relating to the acquisition
of property for open space purposes, provided, that "property so acquired and dedicated,
shall, if it is to be sold within a period of 10 years after the acquisition thereof, beoffered first to the owner from whom it was acquired. . ..
A.B. 2299, 1963 Regular Session, as amended May 16, 1963, contained an interesting
variation of the 10-year period with a dual theme. It provided for resale of property to
the owner at a price equal to the amount of the condemnation award if resale occurredwithin 10 years of acquisition. However:
If such property was acquired by eminent domain more than 10 years prior
to the date the acquiring entity proposes to sell it or use it for purposes other
than that for which it was acquired, the entity must first offer the property for
sale to the person or persons or owners from whom the property was acquired
at a price equal to its fair market value.
In essence then, the bill creates a repurchase right with a 10-year limitation, plus a
diluted repurchase option for longer periods of time, presumably indefinitely. For a
similar system, see A.B. 2110, 1972 Regular Session, and A.B. 1365, 1969 Regular
Session.
137. See 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1-410 (Purdon Supp. 1970): "[the property may
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Mexico and South Carolina statutes'3 8 and most of the bills that have
been proposed in California have suggested a five-year period.13 9 Which
of these time limits, if any, is preferable?
A fixed period of approximately seven years, measured from the date
of acquisition of the property, seems to be the best solution. It would
prevent the right of return from existing in perpetuity, while lasting
sufficiently long to include most disposals of surplus land that occur
after the conclusion of a project. Also, after seven years separa-
tion from title, a former owner's emotional stake in the property has
probably dissipated sufficiently to satisfy notions of fairness. The
seven year period would encompass almost all instances in which a
condemnor has put property to a brief or temporary public use and has
thereafter devoted it to a private use, and it would allow a condemnor
to devote property to an intermediate private use-provided the property
was devoted to public use by the end of the term. 140
It should be recognized, however, that a condemnor with sufficient
financial resources could defeat the purpose of a right to return statute
by merely holding the property for temporary public use until the
prescribed duration period expires and then dispose of the property in
any manner it sees fit. There does not seem to be any practical way
to avoid this.141
Relation of a Repurchase Right to Common Law Rights
Since the repurchase right would become operative where a con-
demnor allegedly acquired property for a public use but thereafter
sought to devote it to a private use, the right could exist in circum-
stances where the former owner might also claim that the acquisition
itself was fraudulent in that it was not for a public use. If the ac-
quisition were in fact fraudulent, the former owner should be al-
lowed to pursue his common law remedies for fraud by way of col-
not be disposed of] within three years after condemnation without first being offered
to the condemnee." Heistad Proposal §216(2) and A.B.A. Model Code §313A contain
identical provisions.
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE §25-53 (1962).
139. California bills which specify a five-year period after acquisition for the prop-
erty to be offered first to the former owner before resale are: A.B. 1570, 1969 RegularSession, A.B. 2087 and 1719, 1968 Regular Session, A.B. 2570, 1967 Regular Session,
A.B. 2882 and 3317, 1965 Regular Session, and A.B. 2769, 1963 Regular Session.140. See, e.g., Cain v. S.C. Public Serv. Auth., 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d 177 (1952)in which the South Carolina five-year repurchase statute was held to require public
use at the end of the period despite temporary intervening public use. 222 S.C. at 208,
72 S.E.2d at 185.
141. A requirement that the property actually be devoted to the public use for
which it was acquired within the limitation period or offered to the former owner for
repurchase would require many exceptions (see discussion at notes 54-57 supra) and
would unduly limit the flexibility of the public entity to put property to temporary or
alternate public uses.
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lateral attack on the condemnation. Absent such a provision, a con-
demnor discovered taking property for a private purpose would at-
tempt to force a repurchase by the former owner rather than allow
the property to revert.' 42 Thus, the fraud remedy would be rendered
nugatory. Accordingly, provision should be made to allow the con-
demnee to pursue his fraud remedies without forfeiting his rights in the
property or being forced to accept a repurchase.
PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE OF
A REPURCHASE RIGHT
The repurchase right should be easily exercisable. The following
procedural framework is recommended to accomplish this end. When
a condemnor acquires property by condemnation or by purchase under
threat of condemnation, any condemnee who is potentially entitled
to a repurchase right should be required to record his repurchase in-
terest in the property. If the condemnor, within the term of dura-
tion of the right, decides to devote property to a private use, it should
be required to notify the holder of an applicable recorded repurchase
right that it is selling the property. After notification, the potential
repurchaser should have a limited time within which to purchase the
property at the price stipulated by law. If the right is not exercised
within the designated time period, the condemnor should then be free
to dispose of the property as it sees fit. If the condemnor devotes
the property to a private use without notifying the repurchase right
holder then that person should be able to bring suit to establish his
repurchase interest. If a transferee of the right has failed to record
the repurchase interest, he should not be able to recover the property.
If the transferee's interest is recorded he should recover the property at
the price provided by the statute or recover an amount equal to that
which the condemnor received in excess of the repurchase price. These
proposals are examined in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Recordation of the Right
In California, an option agreement that affects an interest in real
property is a recordable interest.' 43  Once recorded, it gives con-
structive notice to all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.'"
It ceases to give constructive notice if there is no recorded renewal
142. The property evidently reverts without requirement of returning the con-
sideration, just as it does when a lease expires, if it was taken by eminent domain for a
private use. However, there is apparently no authority on this point.
143. CAL. GOVT CODE §27288.
144. CAL. Crv. Code §1213.
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or exercise of it within one year after its expiration date. 140 Under
the procedures proposed herein, when property is taken by eminent
domain, the recorded order of condemnation will set forth the repur-
chase option.140 If taken by purchase, the deed given to the con-
demnor will contain the right.. 47  Upon transfer of the right, the new
holder must record his interest. Recordation in any of these cases must
occur in order to perfect the repurchase right and will give construc-
tive notice of the right to all would-be purchasers and encumbrancers
throughout the limitations period without regard to renewal or exer-
cise of the right. Recordation will also specify the persons entitled to
exercise the repurchase option-an important safeguard should the
condemnor attempt to sell the property to someone other than the
former owner.
Notification of Intention to Sell
If during the life of the repurchase right, the condemnor determines
that it no longer needs the property for a public use, it should be able
to dispose of the property as it sees fit after first offering it for sale to
the holder of the repurchase right at the price determined by statute.
Although it seems arguable that difficulty in determining the residences
of both original and subsequent holders of the right may impose a
costly administrative burden on condemnors,148 the significance of this
145. CAL. Civ. CODE §1213.5.
146. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1253 requires the condemnation
order to be recorded.
California Business and Professions Code Section 11525.2 provides for recordation of
the right of a developer to return of property dedicated for school purposes:
The school district to which the property is dedicated shall record a certificate
with the county recorder in the county in which the property is located.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
1. The name and address of the subdivider dedicating the property.
2. A legal description of the real property dedicated.
3. A statement that the subdivider dedicating the property has an option to
repurchase the property if it is not used by the school district as a school site
within 10 years after dedication.
4. Proof of the acceptance of the dedication by the school district and the
date of the acceptance.
The certificate shall be recorded not more than 10 days after the date of
acceptance of the dedication. The subdivider shall have the right to compel
the school district to record such certificate, but until such certificate is re-
corded, any rights acquired by any third party dealing in good faith with the
school district shall not be impaired or otherwise affected by the option right
of the subdivider.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11525.2.
147. In this way, when the deed is recorded, the repurchase interest is simultane-
ously recorded. If the interest is omitted from the deed, the former owner is able to
record the repurchase interest by separate instrument. This is also necessary for a
transferee of the right to perfect his interest.
To ensure that the property owner is treated fairly, the condemnor should be obli-
gated to inform him of his repurchase right as early as the period of negotiation over
the property.
148. See, e.g., Staff Memorandum to the Assembly Comm. on Local Gov't at 7(Nov. 26, 1969) for 1969 Open Space Hearings.
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problem is reduced by the fact that the right will have been re-
corded and the condemnor will need only look in the records to de-
termine to whom the property must be offered for repurchase. Once
the name of the holder of the right is known, the address should be ascer-
tainable. If, however, the holder has moved or left the county, he
can be required to send notice of his change in address to the county
clerk where the property is located.
Notice of intent to sell 149 will be in writing and will be served on the
person entitled to purchase in much the same way that a summons is
served-i.e., by process reasonably calculated to give actual notice of
the proceedings.1"' The New Mexico and Rhode Island statutes and
the Vermont proposal, for example, provide for notice by certified mail
to the last known address of the condemnee or his successor in inter-
est."' In California, service generally, 152 and in condemnation cases
specifically, 53 may be by personal delivery, by first class mail with ac-
knowledgment of receipt, or by publication if the other means are im-
possible. Accordingly, if a condemnor is unable to locate a former
owner or his successors after a diligent inquiry, publication should be
adequate notification of sale.1 54
The written notice can be used to inform the former owner of his
legal rights. It can also include the names and addresses of the other
persons to whom notice concerning the particular parcel is being sent.
Thus, if a multiple ownership problem arises, the parties may be able
to reach an agreement prior to exercise of the repurchase right.
Disputes could arise in either of the following situations: (1) The
holder records, but the condemnor is unable to locate him because
he has failed to supply address changes or is simply unavailable at the
149. At least one California Bill suggested simple notice of sale to the former
owner, rather than a repurchase interest:
Whenever a public entity which has acquired property by exercise of the right
of eminent domain determines that such property, or any part thereof, is no
longer necessary for the public use for which the property was acquired, it
shall notify the former owner from whom such property was acquired.
A.B. 1914, 1969 Regular Session.
150. The Pennsylvania statute provides, "The condemnee shall be served with no-
tice of the offer in the same manner as prescribed for the service of notices in subsec-
tion (b) of Section 405 of this act . . . ." 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §1-410 (Purdon Supp.
1970). Section 405(b) simply provides for service in the same manner as a complaint
or by certified mail.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-9-62 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §37-7-3
(1956); VEzRmoNT DRAFT ACT §5678(a).
152. CAr.. CODE CIV. PROC. §§415.10-415.50.
153. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1245 provides that service in con-
demnation cases "must be in the form of a summons in civil actions, and must be
served in like manner."
154. For example, the British statute, Section 128, provides for sale to the original
owner "unless such person refuses to purchase the same. or cannot after diligent inquiry
be found." Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, §128.
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time; (2) The holder records, but the condemnor willfully or inad-
vertently ignores the repurchase right and privately disposes of the
property without consulting the former owner.
If the former owner records his right but cannot be located by a dili-
gent effort, the condemnor should be allowed to serve notice by
publication. If there is no affirmative response within 60 days of pub-
lication, the condemnor should be free to dispose of the property. If
the former owner records but the condemnor fails to follow the pre-
scribed resale procedures, the former owner or his successor in inter-
est should have a valid claim for his repurchase right or its value if
the property has been sold.
Time Limit for Exercise of the Right After Notification of Intent to
Sell by the Condemnor
Once the condemnor has notified the holder of the repurchase right
that it intends to sell the property, the former owner will be required
to act upon his right within a reasonable time. The New Mexico and
Rhode Island statutes, the Vermont proposal, the former California
Agricultural Code provision, and California Assembly Bill 343 (1963
Regular Session) provide a 30-day period within which the condemnee
could exercise his option. The British statute allows exercise within six
weeks after the offer,155 while the Pennsylvania and federal statutes allow
a full 90 days.' 56 Any time limit chosen will be somewhat arbitrary.
Nonetheless, the limit should be designed to allow the condemnee ade-
quate time to make a decision and obtain the necessary financing, with-
out unduly burdening the condemnor. A 60-day period following ac-
tual receipt of notice should protect all interests adequately, particularly
if disputing claimants are allowed to purchase first and subsequently de-
termine their interests in court.
The holder of the right may find it difficult to exercise the right
within 60 days if he is a minor, 57 imprisoned, or otherwise incapaci-
tated. However, these incapacities are not as great a hindrance in
purchasing property as they might be in maintaining a law suit; and,
in most cases, a minor or incompetent will have a guardian who
is able to exercise his right for him. To require the limitations period
to toll for incapacity is to hamper the condemnor's alienability of prop-
erty for an indefinite period. Rather than make an exception for in-
155. Id. § 129.
156. 26 PA. STAT. ANN. §401 (Purdon Supp. 1970); Surplus Property Act of
1944. P.L. 78-453, §23, 56 Stat. 765.
157. This could easily occur where the right has been inherited.
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capacity, the repurchase right should be exercisable during a single lim-
ited period, or go unexercised. 15
If the condemnee rejects the offer, or if he fails to make the purchase
within the allotted time, then the condemnor should be free to sell the
property as otherwise provided by law.
Breach of Duty by Condemnor
If the condemnor fails to offer the property to the holder of the
right, the holder should bear the burden of initiating proceedings to
establish his repurchase interest. The proceedings should not be elab-
orate, and the unnotified holder should be able to establish his right
merely by proving the fact of devotion to a private use or long con-
tinued nonuse without proper notification to him.
The following burdens and presumptions would seem to be ap-
propriate. If the holder of the repurchase interest demonstrates that
the condemnor has sold the property to a private person and that the
condemnor did not acquire the property for sale to a private person
(under authority of excess, substitute, or redevelopment condemna-
tion), he will have established a prima facie case of devotion to a pri-
vate use. Similarly, if the condemnor has allowed the land to lie
idle for the repurchase period, or has not devoted it to a public use by
the end of the period, or has devoted the land only to a brief public
use during the period, and if the land was not acquired for open
space or future use this would also be a prima facie case of devotion to
private use.
Where a condemnor has sold property without proper notification to
the holder of the repurchase right, an action to establish the right should
be filed within six months after the termination of the repurchase
period. Six months is necessary because, when land acquired for fu-
ture use is not devoted to a public use within the repurchase period,
the holder of the repurchase right must have a reasonable time within
which to act. There is no overriding reason to toll the six months lim-
itations period during the incapacity of the holder of the repurchase
right. '
On the other hand, when property was acquired for some general
public use but, after a brief period of time, it is clear that the property
is being devoted permanently to a private use, the condemnee should
158. Minority and incapacity do not generally toll limitations requirements in the
case of tort claims against public entities. See CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§911.2-911.6.
159. The case for tolling may be stronger in this situation, for a court action,
rather than a purchase arrangement is required.
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not be forced to await the termination of the repurchase period to
establish his right. In this situation proof of private use may be re-
butted by the condemnor's proof of an intention to devote the prop-
erty to a public use within the prescribed period.160 Where the con-
demnor is successful in this rebuttal, the holder may subsequently
renew his claim on a showing that the condemnor has not carried out
its professed intentions.
If it appears in court that there is a reasonable probability that the
property will be devoted to a public use within a reasonable time,
although not within the seven-year limitations period, it may be de-
sirable either to extinguish or extend the repurchase right rather than to
have it presently exercisable. This would enable the condemnor to
avoid having to recondemn in the near future, with the attendant dis-
ruptions and expenses. 161 In such a case, the condemnor should
bear the burden of proving reasonable probability of devotion to a public
use within a reasonable time.
Once the former owner's repurchase right has been established, the
court will render an appropriate remedial order. If the property has
been abandoned, the court should be allowed to order it to be sold to the
former owner. If the property has been leased to a private person, the
court should be able to order it to be sold subject to the lease, with
rentals from the lease going to the former owner. If the property has
already been sold to a private person, the court's order will be more
difficult to draft.
The various repurchase proposals are unanimous in holding that
failure by the condemnor to follow prescribed procedures should not
affect or cloud the title of a purchaser.'1 2 One California bill, for
160. The A.B.A. Model Code contains an analogous proposal in Section 313B:
If the condemnee shall claim that the condennor has, in fact, abandoned the
project, the burden of proof shall be on the condemnor to disprove intention
to abandon when there has been long continued non-user.
161. For example, suppose the law is changed to require return to the former
owner whenever property is not put to the use for which it was taken within a rela-
tively short period. A condemnor acquires property to develop a public park. Funds
fail, and the condemnor is presently unable to develop the park although intending to
do so in the future. The condemnor would be forced to return the land to the former
owner who would, perhaps, subdivide it and build a housing development. Years
later when the condemnor obtains money to develop the park, it would be forced ei-
ther to recondemn the property, paying the greatly increased value of a developed
property, or look elsewhere. This problem could be avoided by providing a right of
return only where the condemnor actually plans to put property to long-term private use
as opposed to guaranteeing return where property is not put to a public use. Such a
solution, however, would deny the condemnor the choice of freely leasing the land for
compatible purposes in the interim.
162. The Ontario study states flatly, "Failure to follow legislative provisions of
this sort should not affect title to the land." 3 ONRIuo ROYAL COMMISSION INQUIRY
INTO CIvIL RIGHTS, REPORT NUMBER ONE, at 1076 (1968). Cf. S.B. 53, CAL. STATS.
1972, c. 1331.
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example, implied that there should be no sanctions even if the con-
demnor ignores the repurchase provisions.'"
Failure by the public entity to give notice to the person or per-
sons entitled to repurchase shall not affect the title or lien acquired
by a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value, with-
out knowledge of such failure by the public entity.
While the policy that title to the property should remain clear and un-
clouded is commendable, this provision seems unrealistic in that the
recordation of the repurchase right should prevent the existence of a
bona fide purchase. This is due to the fact that recordation of the re-
purchase interest gives constructive notice of the title encumbrance to
all prospective purchasers. Thus, there is no compelling reason to
deny the holder of a repurchase right a remedy in this situation.
Several proposals guard against abuse by a condemnor by requir-
ing the condemnor to certify that it has complied with the statutory re-
quirement of giving the first opportunity to purchase to the former
owner or his successor. A typical California bill states:
When such land is sold to a person other than the former owner,
a recital in the deed to the effect that the provisions of this sec-
tion have been complied with shall be deemed prima facie evi-
dence that such is the case, and conclusive evidence thereof in fa-
vor of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value' 64
The British are not quite so ready to give credibility to a condemnor's
recitals and go further to assure that a condemnor will comply with
the statutory requirements. The British statute requires:165
[A] declaration in writing made before a justice by some person not
interested in the matter in question, stating that such offer was
made, and was refused, or not accepted within six weeks from the
time of making the same, or that the person or all the persons enti-
tled to the right of pre-emption were out of the country, or could
not after diligent inquiry be found, or were not capable of enter-
ing into a contract for the purchase of such lands, shall in all courts
be sufficient evidence of the facts therein stated.
163. A.B. 343, 1963 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1963.
164. This is the language of A.B. 1570, 1969 Regular Session, A.B. 1719, 1968
Regular Session, A.B. 2570, 1967 Regular Session, as introduced, A.B. 2882, 1965 Regu-
lar Session, and A.B. 2769, 1963 Regular Session. A.B. 2087, as amended, July 22,
1968, uses a similar concept but phrases it somewhat differently:
When such land is sold to a person other than the former owner, and an ac-
tion concerning such land is brought against such person, a recital in the deed
to the effect that the provisions of this section have been complied with shall
establish a rebuttable presumption that such provisions have been complied
with. Such rebuttable presumption shall be one affecting the burden of proof.
In the event the action is against a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for
value, the recital shall establish a conclusive presumption that the provisions
have been complied with.
165. Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Viet., c. 18, §129.
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Some provision such as this is necessary so that an unexercised
repurchase right will not become a cloud on the title of a private pur-
chaser. Whether the provision should go as far as the British rule
is debatable. The South Carolina statute has a provision whereby,
if the former owner fails to exercise his right within one year following
the five-year limitations period, the condemnor may give 90 days
notice, at the expiration of which the condemnor is free to dispose of
the property without reversionary interests. 0 6
The simplest solution is to allow the condemnor's recitals of com-
pliance to be conclusive as to ownership of the property. To pre-
vent abuse, however, a condemnor that makes false recitals should
be liable to the holder of the right for the difference between the ac-
tual sale price of the property and the price the former owner would
have paid for it. Thus, the holder of the right would recover the
property from the purchaser if the condemnor had made no recital of
compliance. If, however, the condemnor had made a false recital of
compliance, the holder could recover damages from the condemnor.
CONCLUSION
A substantial amount of property taken for public use is ultimately
devoted to private purposes, and it is estimated that this amount will
increase in the future. Should the former owner of such property be
given preferential rights over other buyers?
The very concept of the sovereign power of eminent domain
seems to demand that if property taken is not actually needed for a pub-
lic use, it should be returned to private ownership. In equity and logic
this return should be made to the person with the greatest emotional
and economic investment in the land-that is, the person from whom
it was taken. Nonetheless, present law allows a condemnor that has
acquired property for a public use to dispose of the property freely
even when the public need ceases to exist.
After examining the broad concept of a right to return, it is con-
cluded that if a right to return is to exist, it should be applicable
whether the land was acquired by actual exercise of the power of
eminent domain, or by negotiated settlement made under threat of
condemnation. It is further concluded that if a choice were to be made
between an easement, reversion, or repurchase right, the latter is
perhaps the most practical form of right to return.
166. S.C. CODE §25-53 (1962).
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This study then considers several basic qualities of the more narrow
concept of a repurchase right, which include: who may exercise the
right in situations of divergence from a single fee owner model; should
the right be transferable, insurable or taxable; how should the repur-
chase price be determined; what should the duration of the right be;
and what is its relation to any common-law rights. Concrete conclu-
sions in this area were not always made, and, when made, they tend to
be so tentative that they will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say
that a great many practical difficulties are involved, especially in the
area of determining the repurchase price.
Finally, a procedural framework is suggested which would make the
repurchase right as easily exercisable as possible. This framework
would require that the recorded condemnation order set forth the fact of
the repurchase right. Thereafter, if during the life of the repurchase
right, the condemnor determines that it no longer needs the prop-
erty for a public use, it should be required to serve a written notice of
intent to sell to the person entitled to make a repurchase. Once
the holder of the repurchase right receives the notice of intent to sell
from the condemnor, he should then be required to act upon his right
within a reasonable time or it will be deemed to have been waived.
The related problem of what protection should be afforded to the
holder of the repurchase right against a breach of duty to notify by the
condemnor is also discussed, and it is concluded that any third party
bona fide purchaser from the condemnor should be protected in his
ownership of the purchased land. The proper remedy for the holder of
the repurchase right in this situation would be a monetary award from
the condemnor.
Having examined the repurchase right, its problems and potentials,
should it be adopted? The conclusion of the author is that its crea-
tion will cause practical and conceptual difficulties that overshadow the
social benefits it might confer.'6"
167. A British Columbia study reached a similar conclusion:
However, after the most careful consideration and with some reluctance,
we have reached the conclusion that the disadvantage of the complexities in-
volved outweighs the advantage that would be gained on the few occasions
when such a provision would be exercised.
LAw REFORM COMM'N OF BRITlSH COLumBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRATION 120 (1971).
The mere fact that a general right of return is inadvisable does not, however, preclude
the possibility that other forms of preferential treatment could be made available to the
former owner of property. There are several possible means of helping to satisfy the
legitimate interest of the former owner without creating the adverse consequences a
general right of return would entail.
A right of return may be feasible if limited to special cases--such as where property
is taken for open space, protective, or future purposes and is thereafter sold within a
short time without substantial physical alteration. The Surplus Property Act of 1944
(P.L. 78-457, 56 Stat. 765), for example, was aimed at the special circumstance of
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property seized during wartime that was no longer necessary at the conclusion of the
war. See also Comment, Abandonment of a Public Works Project-Landowners' Reme-
dies, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 366 (1972).
Likewise, a policy rather than a right to return property to former owners whenever
practical and just should be encouraged. This has been the policy of the California
Division of Highways in the past. Similarly, following the repeal of the Surplus
Property Act of 1944, the Administrator of General Services was authorized to negoti-
ate with former owners for the repurchase of their property even though no repurchase
rights were conferred. See, e.g., P.L. 82-522, P.L. 83-245, P.L. 83-492, P.L. 84-971, and
P.L. 85-486.
Other possibilities are simply to notify the former owner that his property will be
sold to give him the opportunity to bid (see note 149 supra), or to allow the former
owner any profit made by the condemnor on the resale of the property. The merits of
the latter are fairly obvious: it permits the condemnor free use and disposal of the
property; it undercuts any profit incentive of the condemnor; and it reimburses the
former owner for any value he might have realized absent the intrusion of the con-
demnor. However, it does not return the land to the former owner, and thereby fails
to satisfy the emotional needs that form a basis of the repurchase right.
